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INTRODUCTION
Until fairly recently, public opinion about the government’s role in
improving public health could be simply characterized.  When a public
health crisis arose, the public expected, even desired, that the govern-
ment take some form of action.1  Increasingly, in recent decades, that
government action took the form of new laws or regulations designed
to achieve public health outcomes through coercion, compliance, or
deterrence.  But, in recent years, public health law interventions
shifted toward “nudging” as a key method of inducing optimal public
health behavior and achieving improved health outcomes.2  With this
nudging came objections from scholars who argued that these inter-
ventions were simply going too far.3
Public opinion in favor of “old frontier” interventions was critical to
determining when and how to mobilize legislatures to pass laws de-
signed to address a given public health crisis.  With respect to these
traditional command and control law regimes, such as laws focused on
drunk driving, research and evidence about public support for these
laws was reasonably confined to focusing on support for law enact-
ment.4  But, once these deterrent-centered laws were enacted, efforts
1. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 1–2 (2009).
2. As defined by Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge “is any aspect of the choice architecture that
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives.” RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IM-
PROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). See also CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (2013); RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING:
THE MAKING OF BEHAVIOR ECONOMICS 232–25 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public
Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 90–91 (Supp. 2013)
(challenging these objections).
4. For example, with respect to early research designed to explore methods to reduce in-
stances and consequences of drunken driving, researchers identified that the public would need
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shifted toward focusing on enforcement as the primary tool to induce
the desired behavior from the general public.  Generally speaking,
provided that the enforcement capacity was available and utilized, the
public did not have to necessarily like the intervention for it to have
the expected effect of reducing the targeted public health harm.
But, the new world of public health nudging is different.  In addi-
tion to the importance of public support for the initial passing or im-
plementation of nudge-style interventions, public support is critical
post law enactment for the law to achieve maximum effectiveness.
This effectiveness depends on continuing support for the law’s objec-
tives, especially if that support translates into action by individuals
that alters behavior.  Therefore, while public support for nudge-based
interventions does not guarantee that the intervention will change be-
havior, it is a necessary ingredient.  Thus, one additional reason to
continuously evaluate public opinion about new public health inter-
ventions is that the public may need a sustained messaging campaign
to maintain and build support for the intervention postenactment, and
thus, ensure compliance over time absent a formal enforcement mech-
anism.  In recent years, the scope and legitimacy of public health au-
thority has been substantially questioned, and scholars have shaped
influential responses to these critiques amidst some uncertainty about
where public opinion presently stands.5  Some recent studies also sug-
gest a wider-than-expected divergence of support for various public
health law interventions challenging claims for broad public support.6
Therefore, this Article seeks to build on this scholarship by providing
additional evidence about the scope and strength of public support for
new-frontier public health law interventions.
To engage this debate, I gathered evidence about public support,
norms, and behavioral change with respect to a series of recent public
health law interventions.  This evidence suggests that although these
interventions receive widespread public support and shape public
norms, public support and adoption of norms is highly contingent on
membership in a subset of sociodemographic groups.  But no matter
to be educated to support new laws, which would then serve as a necessary step toward future
lawmaking efforts, allowing for an incremental increase in drunk-driving public health law inter-
ventions over time. See, e.g., David A. Sleet et al., Introduction: Drinking, Driving, and Health
Promotion, 16 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 329 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Beyond Paternalism: Rethinking the Limits of Public Health
Law, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1771 (2014); Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social
Norms, and the Law: The Normative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1877 (2014).
6. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Controlling Health Care Costs Through Public, Transparent
Processes: The Conflict Between the Morally Right and the Socially Feasible, 36 J. CORP. L. 807,
813–17 (2011) (describing public response to a variety of contested interventions).
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the legal domain, “public opposition is a potential barrier to effective
implementation” of any new law.7  And, with an increasing focus on
challenging the legitimacy of public health lawmaking efforts, there is
substantial value in identifying and reinforcing the consistency and sa-
liency of “public health’s democratic roots.”8  Therefore, it is useful to
identify how empirical evidence about public support for these inter-
ventions should be incorporated into both public health lawmaking
and public health law research.
But, while at the individual level the decision to adopt or embrace a
public health law should obviously be salient and central to both the
process of lawmaking and dissemination of the law’s content, much
more can be said about the application of public opinion and political
psychology to this process.9  While policy optimization is important,
moving from policy creation and implementation to the communica-
tion and persuasion required for individuals to adopt policy norms
and modify behaviors and beliefs is equally worthy of the sustained
scientific effort of public health law scholars and others engaged in
this debate.10  As Professor Dan M. Kahan explains: “Neither the
mechanisms for generating evidence-based risk communication nor
the shared professional understandings necessary to enable its suc-
cessful execution exist today.”11 Due to recent public health law inter-
7. Tho Bella Dinh-Zarr et al., Reviews of Evidence Regarding Interventions to Increase the Use
of Safety Belts, 21 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 48, 52 (Supp. 2011).
8. Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Adventures in Nannydom: Reclaiming Collective Action for the Pub-
lic’s Health, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 75 (Supp. 2015).
9. Thus, this Article builds on the recent work of Stephanie Morain & Michelle M. Mello,
Survey Finds Public Support for Legal Interventions Directed at Health Behavior To Fight
Noncommunicable Disease, 32 HEALTH AFF. 486, 487 (2013), which describes the general ab-
sence of public opinion work with respect to public health law interventions and deploys a na-
tional survey designed to test the relationship between public perception of legitimacy and
support for various interventions.
10. See Sungwoo Lim & Tiffany G. Harris, Neighborhood Contributions to Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Obesity Among New York City Adults, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 159 (2015) (intro-
ducing a sophisticated data analysis of confounding policy-related variables linked to race and
ethnic-obesity outcome disparities but without mention of public opinion, communication, and
dissemination of these policies as mediating influences); see also Emma Elizabeth McGinty et
al., Gun Policy and Serious Mental Illness: Priorities for Future Research and Policy, 65 PSYCHI-
ATRIC SERVS. 50, 56 (2014) (focusing on policy design but not messaging or communication);
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing
Epidemiologic Research to Policy, 25 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 366 (2015) (gathering and ana-
lyzing data from a variety of sources to create optimal policy for the reduction of gun violence).
The scholarly rigor in these works centers on recommendations involving the nuances of how
science and epidemiology can inform public health law creation but not on how public opinion
or political psychology can be used to influence either communication or persuasion with respect
to the same public health law interventions.
11. DAN M. KAHAN, VACCINE RISK PERCEPTIONS AND AD HOC RISK COMMUNICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT, CCP RISK PERCEPTION STUDIES REPORT NO. 17, at 10 (2014).
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ventions and regimes, we have ample evidence showing that (theory
notwithstanding) poor communication can actually engender and ex-
acerbate public opposition to these interventions.12
Public health law research has shown that some public health law
interventions have: (1) enjoyed broad public support; (2) been easily
adopted; and (3) positively impacted public health outcomes; on the
other hand, some laws—and proposed laws—encounter significant re-
sistance, and thus have a decreased impact on improving public health
outcomes.13  But, because attention to innovation in public health law
interventions has been increasing, not slowing, and because cities,
states, and the federal government are passing more laws to protect
the public health, now is an optimal time to consider how to best ef-
fectively communicate with and influence the public about modifying
public health behaviors.
The survey-research results in this Article attempt to contribute to-
ward reducing the theoretical noise and suggest new directions for fu-
ture research centered in optimizing methods for both making and
communicating public health law and policy.  Many recent public
health law interventions, absent significant coercion or criminal en-
forcement penalties, rely much more heavily on persuasion (the sell)
than they do on traditional theories of criminal deterrence.14  To align
research with real-world application, the public health law interven-
tions analyzed in this Article, and the survey instrument discussed in-
fra, by and large rely on a combination of education, nudges, and less-
invasive enforcement regimes to accomplish their goals.15  To improve
the theoretical and empirical foundations for existing and future inter-
ventions,16 this Article gathers public opinion data from an original
national survey sample of more than 2,000 adults in the United
12. E.g., Sarah E. Gollust et al., Controversy Undermines Support for State Mandates on the
Human Papillomavirus Vaccine, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2041, 2045 (2010).
13. E.g., Rebecca Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 N. ENG. J. MED.
986, 988 (2014) (cautioning that an expansive use of law for public health interventions, particu-
larly those that are labeled public health emergencies, may cause the public to “lose trust in
health officials, which may result in a loss of political legitimacy as well as a backlash against
public health laws more generally”).
14. See discussion infra Sections IV.B., V.B., and VI.B.
15. See Kerri McGowan Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State Experiences Implementing
Youth Sports Concussion Laws: Challenges, Successes, and Lessons for Evaluating Impact, 42
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 297 (2014) (assessing implementation of youth sports TBI laws and
finding enforcement of these laws is “largely nonexistent, due to the absence of such language in
the laws and uncertainty about under whose purview enforcement falls”).
16. E.g., Scott Burris et al., Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half-Century of
Public Health Law Research, 9 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 95, 96 (2013) (“There was little cross-
fertilization of methods . . . .  Research on health laws has not been informed by theory and
methods developed in sociolegal research.”).
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States.17  To resolve uncertainties about the impact of these new inter-
ventions when filtered through the lens of public opinion, the sample
engages a variety of recent public health law domains (smoking, food
and diet, and youth sports traumatic brain injuries (TBIs)).  The study
then asks several questions, including: (1) whether lawmaking in these
domains is generally supported by the public; (2) if sociodemographic
barriers impede the public’s general acceptance and adoption of these
laws; and (3) whether other variables, such as the nature of how these
laws are communicated or the substance of the laws’ education com-
ponents, substantially impact or modify the public’s decision to adopt
the laws’ norming principles.18  Throughout, the goal of the survey
was to capture and compare attitudes about laws situated somewhere
between more traditional quasi-deterrent regimes on the one hand
(smoking and sports bans, for example), and information-based nudge
regimes designed to either structure or influence individual choices
and behaviors on the other (such as calorie counts and concussion
education).
This Article unfolds in six parts.  Part II builds on prior works and
describes a political–psychological approach to understanding support
for public health law interventions.19  Part III describes the survey
methodology.20  Parts IV and V explore the recent history of two pub-
lic health law domains and public support for interventions within
those respective domains.21  Part VI builds on the previous two Parts
by focusing on a newly salient domain, youth sports TBI laws, and
applies two experimental methodologies to the framework: (1) testing
the effect of differentiations on the public’s response for the interven-
tion to different authoritative support for the intervention; and (2)
testing the effect of education and information on persuasion.22  Part
VII explores sociodemographic variance in attitudes across all of these
interventions and asks whether this variance has particular implica-
tions for future public health law interventions.23  The Article con-
cludes with a call for further research.24
17. See infra Part III (explaining the original survey’s methodology).
18. While focusing on sociodemographic differences and political psychology, this work is also
influenced by the theory of planned behavior. See generally Icek Ajzen, The Theory of Planned
Behavior, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179 (1991).
19. See infra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. R
20. See infra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. R
21. See infra notes 61–132 and accompanying text. R
22. See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text. R
23. See infra notes 159–74 and accompanying text. R
24. See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. R
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II. TOWARD A POLITICAL–PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
Leaders in public health law research evaluated a range of legal ef-
fect theories across diverse fields to inform the methodology used in
public health law research.25  A variety of literature and approaches
attempt to tie the underlying theoretical perspective to the public’s
agreement to either adopt new legal norms or change existing behav-
ior based on these laws’ prescriptive or proscriptive content.  For ex-
ample, scholars led by professor Tom R. Tyler and colleagues pivot to
the role of the state’s legitimacy when enacting new legal regimes de-
signed to coerce or influence behavior through a variety of methods.26
A newer strand of research, conducted by Dan M. Kahan and col-
leagues, focuses on a vector of values, which for a given subset of law
interventions, may serve as an important predictor of opinion or con-
straint on individual behavior.  Through an interest in broadening
their audience to include public health researchers and policy advo-
cates, Tyler, Kahan, and others have directly engaged their work to
new issues in public health.27  Still, other theorists posit a cost-benefit
framework for behavior modification and law adoption at the individ-
ual level, rooted in classical economic perspectives centered on the
nexus between the cost of achieving the law’s desired behavioral mod-
ification and the cost-benefit of noncompliance.28  Taxation as a
method of public health strategy remains front and center in national
discourse.29  In addition, a variety of important ethical concerns with
both past and present public health policies and interventions inform
debates about the costs and benefits of these interventions.30  These
perspectives add broad value to the field of public health law research,
25. See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH: THEORY AND METHODS passim (Alexander C.
Wagenaar & Scott C. Burris eds., 2013) (ebook) [hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
REASEARCH].
26. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 71 (1990); see PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIB-
UTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008) (ex-
plaining that it is necessary for authorities to articulate distributive principles to maintain
legitimacy); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMU-
NITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1995).
27. See, e.g., KAHAN, supra note 11, at 13–18; Tom R. Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Procedural R
Justice Theory, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 247–48. R
28. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 202. R
29. Michelle M. Mello & I. Glenn Cohen, The Taxing Power and the Public’s Health, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1777, 1779 (2012); see also Alexander C. Wagenaar, Melvin D. Livingston, and
Stephanie S. Staras, Effects of a 2009 Illinois Alcohol Tax Increase on Fatal Motor Vehicle
Crashes, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1880 (September 2015) (describing public health effects of an
alcohol tax on alcohol-related fatalities in Illinois).
30. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Law, Bioethics, and Biotechnology, in
13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (James D. Wright
ed., 2d ed.) (forthcoming 2015).
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but none are squarely centered on the role of public opinion as ap-
plied to nudge-based public health law interventions.  To provide an
alternative (or supplement) to these research regimes, this Article en-
gages political science and political psychology frameworks to explore
the connection between nudge-based interventions, public opinion,
and public health outcomes.
Thus, this Article builds on the aforementioned scholarly traditions
but suggests that we can learn a lot about recent interventions by ap-
plying a political psychology framework.  In such a framework, politi-
cal–psychological processes related to sociodemographic group
membership are the primary drivers of individual preferences, atti-
tudes, and behaviors with respect to law interventions.  For example,
some public health law interventions threaten individual interests (e.g.
antismoking laws for smokers) and should in turn reduce public sup-
port among the most self-interested groups across particular public
health domains.31  And, because ideological strength can drive indi-
vidual rejection of new laws, it is expected that conservative members
of the public will reject public health law interventions at higher rates
than moderate and liberal members.  Race and other soci-
odemographic variables are signals of certain cultural, political, and
psychological norms rooted in an individual’s group membership, and
will serve as psychological and political filters at the individual level,
influencing both support for these laws as well as compliance with the
intended behavioral nudges these laws seek to create.32
Political psychology theorists assume that one’s sociodemographics
are not genetically determinative of one’s policy views, but instead,
cause an individual to encounter distinct experiences over time, which
then inform these views.33  As one scholar explains: “[African-Ameri-
cans] may not think or act any differently than whites because of their
31. This phenomenon is somewhat consistent with a theory of cognitive dissonance avoidance
or what Kahan and others now refer to as identity-protective cognition.  Dan M. Kahan et al.,
Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 469–70 (2007). Thus, it would be reasonable that one’s identity
as a smoker would prevent support of antismoking laws.
32. But, while the author might expect to find that a particular ethnic group is more likely to
support a given intervention, it would be wrong to suggest that membership in the minority
group is causally related to supporting the intervention.  Nonetheless, as shall be discussed in
Part VII, if it is true that group membership, standing alone, is correlated with stronger or
weaker support, this correlation can still be utilized to develop communication and dissemina-
tion strategies that capitalize on group-based differences regardless of the underlying cause. See
infra notes 159–74 and accompanying text. R
33. See Generally, Donald R. Kinder and Allison Dale-Riddle, THE END OF RACE?: OBAMA,
2008, AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2012).  Within law scholarship, those who study criti-
cal race theory also share this view.  See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-
First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2004) (explaining that one central tenant of
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genetic endowment, but they grow up with a different set of exper-
iences and those different experiences give them qualities that other
people lack.”34  For example, political psychology and public opinion
studies throughout the last several decades show that despite ample
history living through an array of discriminatory legal regimes, Afri-
can-Americans (and to a lesser extent other ethnic minorities) con-
tinue to possess a higher degree of support for a variety of
government policies than white survey respondents.  Yet, as a variety
of scholars have amply demonstrated, this high level of support coex-
ists with a history of formalized inequity and discrimination, especially
with respect to healthcare and public health policies throughout much
of American history.35  Though there are ample historical reasons for
African-Americans to mistrust mainstream medical and health estab-
lishments,36 as well as well-established nonprofit public health re-
gimes,37 it is expected that the group’s consistent and recent
confidence in government institutions and policies will be a more sig-
nificant determinant of support for public health interventions than
any competing or conflicting opinions about historic and present day
legal and medical inequities.38  Thus, it is expected that with respect to
the public health interventions described in this Article, ethnic-minor-
ity respondent support will be, on average, higher than support from
white respondents.
During the past several decades, public opinion surveys have also
shown that women support a wide variety of government policies
critical race theory is that “to be a person of color in America is to be subject to racial
subordination”).
34. David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L. REV. 777, 808
(2005).
35. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Funding Race as Biology: The Relevance of “Race” in
Medical Research, 12 MINN.  J.L. SCI. & TECH. 571, 575–77 (2011) (examining the use of race in
biomedical research); Kevin Outterson, Tragedy and Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in
Black Health, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 735, 747 (2005) (“The history of Black health in
America is cruel and shocking.”).
36. See INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARI-
TIES IN HEALTH CARE 30 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003); see also Michele Goodwin &
Nevin Gewertz, Rethinking Colorblind State Action: A Thought Experiment on Racial Prefer-
ences, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2009, at 251, 262–64.
37. See KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK, AND
SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 63–65, 72, 79 (2014) (describing the legacy of racial coding and
discrimination within the blood bank history).
38. Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine Through
Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 430–33 (2004) (reviewing studies that evaluate the historical
connection between patient ethnicity and trust of doctors and suggesting that public health gains
and support from these groups would be better realized by the deemphasis of trust in doctors in
favor of building confidence in medicine).
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more so than men.39  Thus, it is expected that similar to these prior
samples, women will support public health law interventions at
greater rates than men.  I predicted that this support would be higher
than corresponding male support for nudge-based interventions not-
withstanding that other recent deterrent public health interventions
specifically focused on women have proven to be politically divisive.40
Further, ample evidence suggests that women may have a variety of
reasons to mistrust doctors and healthcare systems, and by extension,
health-related interventions.41  Nevertheless, it is posited that the po-
litical attitudes of women respondents, who have higher levels of over-
all support for government policies, will override any present day
mistrust of medicine or the government’s role in regulating healthcare
policies for women.
Finally, a variety of studies have shown that priming the survey re-
spondent with a trusted, respected, or ideological opponent (messen-
ger or advocate) of a particular policy can trigger an increased
politically supportive or aversive response to the policy.42  Most re-
cently, University of Chicago Postdoctoral Research Fellow, David
Tannenbaum, and his colleagues found evidence of a nudge bias,
which prompted respondents to object to nudges when they were ap-
plied to policy objectives or policymakers they opposed.43  Similarly,
respondents found the same nudges more acceptable when they were
applied to political objectives or policy makers they supported.44
Thus, the survey in this Article contains an experiment varying the
policy supporter and changing the reasoning for the policy objective to
further determine whether sociodemographic group membership and
political ideology influence public support for public health law
interventions.
39. See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE AMERICAN WOMAN & POLITICS, THE GENDER GAP: ATTITUDES
ON PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES (2012), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/
gg_issuesattitudes-2012.pdf.
40. See R. Alta Charo, Physicians and the (Woman’s) Body Politic, 370 N. ENG. J. MED. 193,
193–94 (2014) (describing political and legal conflicts between medicine, science, and recent leg-
islative efforts to regulate various aspects of pregnancy, including the provision of scientifically
contested information to protect the public health).
41. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women
in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 13 (2001) (“[W]omen are more likely to
seek treatment . . . but are also more likely to be inadequately treated by health-care
providers.”).
42. See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK
RES. 147 (2011).
43. David Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioral Policy Interventions 4
(Working Paper), http://scholar.harvard.edu/todd_rogers/publications/misplaced-politics-behav-
ioral-policy-interventions.
44. Id. at 7.
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III. SURVEY DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND
CHOICE OF LAW DOMAINS
I designed a thirty-four question survey instrument with structured
response categories to elicit public opinion on the three public health
intervention policy domains discussed in this Article (smoking, food
and diet, and youth sports TBI laws) and to test within the survey’s
randomized design: (1) the messenger of the law’s efficacy, such as
doctors, political figures, public health advocates; and (2) the role of
additional information in changing the likelihood of public support for
the law.  To achieve facial and content validity, I developed the survey
questionnaire in consultation with public health law researchers, legal
academics, content experts, and methodology advisors at
SurveyMonkey—a professional survey organization. Internal
SurveyMonkey experts evaluated the draft survey, and a brief simu-
lated pilot was run on a small online panel to test for comprehension
and functionality prior to revision of the survey instrument.45
Each of the three aforementioned intervention areas was chosen for
several key reasons.  First, smoking builds on decades of existing law
and messaging, and if time and messaging, standing alone, influence
opinion and behavior, smoking interventions should be the most sup-
ported of the group.  The other two interventions ((1) food and diet
and (2) youth sports TBI laws) represent the “new frontier” of public
health law interventions: those that are most likely to encounter pub-
lic resistance, and thus, are particularly important for evaluation.46
Second, these interventions were chosen because of their potential
public health impact.47  For example, tobacco use and poor diet and
exercise accounts for almost 35% of deaths in the United States.48
Thus, at their core, public health law interventions designed to in-
crease either physical activity or improve diets should have a logic
model for the likelihood of individual support and adoption of the
law’s substance and behavior modification goals.49  The remaining
45. Further details about the design and methodology are in the Appendix. See infra notes
184–86, and accompanying text. R
46. See Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 486–87 (identifying these issues as distinct from R
other more traditional public health law interventions).
47. See, e.g., Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 J.
AM. MED. ASSOC. 1238, 1238–39 (2004) (explaining in part that more intractable problems, such
as obesity, have greater long-term public health consequences than other more direct causes of
harm or death, such as communicable diseases).
48. Id. at 1238.
49. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354
N. ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2602–04 (2006) (providing examples of approaches to obesity in public
health law); see also William H. Dietz & Alicia S. Hunter, Legal Preparedness for Obesity Pre-
vention and Control: The Public Health Framework for Action, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9, 10–11
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parts of this Article attempt to provide evidence to assist in future
research about the intersection of public opinion, new-frontier inter-
ventions, and long-term goals of improving public health.
Because this approach seeks to add to a nascent dialogue, it is nec-
essarily limited in scope.  Subsequent work with the data gathered for
this Article unpacks some field-specific inquiries and explores the sur-
vey results utilizing additional questions not reported here, multi-vari-
ate methods, and terminology intended for a more specialized health-
science audience.  It is expected that future work might explore addi-
tional ways that law intersects with public health, ranging from re-
sponses to state or local emergencies,50 coordinated legal responses to
pandemics,51 state level restrictions on doctor–patient speech,52 social
controls,53 and the use of legally mandated or industry developed
technology initiatives to improve either healthcare management or
patient-health awareness.54  Future research might bridge a variety of
the aforementioned areas and further explain why some interventions
achieve broad support while others encounter significant resistance.
This research should identify the factors that influence public support
for the law or speed the adoption of the desired behavior.  Experi-
mental survey design can help observers further understand the value
in changing both the messenger and the message.  This research can
then be utilized to both better sell existing interventions and become
part of the evidence in evidence-based policy making prior to law en-
actment and implementation.  But, at least initially, this research fo-
cuses on a discrete set of interventions with much substance in
common to provide a useful framework for further exploration of the
aforementioned additional areas.
(2009) (describing wide-ranging efforts to use public health law and regulation to reduce obesity
while acknowledging that the research design for how these interventions can be successfully
deployed is still in its nascent stages).
50. See generally Elizabeth A. Weeks, Lessons from Katrina: Response, Recovery, & the Public
Health Infrastructure, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 251, 256–67 (2007) (explaining the chal-
lenges health care providers face in responding to a natural emergency).
51. Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public Health, 10 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89, 89–90 (2006); Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the
Role of Law in the H1N1 Vaccine Campaign, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 113–14
(2010).
52. See David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
9, 9–10 (2015).
53. Wendy Parmet, Public Health & Social Controls: Implications for Human Rights 11
(Northeastern Pub. Law & Theory Faculty Working Papers Series, No. 44-2010, 2010), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546654.
54. Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 NEV. L.J. 722
(2013) (charting the course of health information technology history and positing trends for the
future).
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The following Parts proceed as follows.  In Parts IV and V, the the-
oretical models for public health intervention with respect to smoking
and food and diet will be situated against the development of recent
public health law interventions at the federal, state, and local levels.55
Viewing these domains separately, public opinion about interventions
in both domains will be examined to determine whether: (1) the pub-
lic generally supports the interventions; and (2) substantial soci-
odemographic differences manifest in this support.  Part VI situates
the theoretical model for intervention with respect to youth sports
concussions against the development of recent state laws designed, in
part, to minimize some instances of these injuries.56  But, rather than
gauge general public support for these interventions, Part VI pivots to
an experiment within the survey experiment designed to determine if
the quality, ideology, or familiarity of the messenger,57 or the educa-
tion component or tone of the message, influences public opinion
about the law intervention.58  Part VII discusses the experiment’s re-
sults and then turns toward a broader discussion about sociodemo-
graphic stratification within the results in Parts IV–V and the
implications for future public health law intervention.59
Reflecting on the abovementioned research and literature, I ex-
pected to find that the general public supports a variety of public
health law interventions by substantial margins.  Further, even when
these interventions intrude on individual autonomy or provide infor-
mation and education that heightens awareness of an individual’s non-
conformity to public health ideals—such as an average daily caloric
intake that diverges substantially from a norm—the general public
will still respond favorably to these interventions.60  Further, although
55. See infra notes 61–132 and accompanying text. R
56. See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text. R
57. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J.
872, 873 (2013) (providing an anecdote of the role that key public figures played in messaging
and influencing public opinion about various provisions in the Affordable Care Act).
58. See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text; Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 88–89 R
(describing the negative effects of messaging these intervention efforts as being part of the
“nanny state”).  In a version of the approach taken by Kahan and colleagues, the name or title of
the expert is simply given while the message remains constant to make the test more salient
based on name or affiliation standing alone.  Dan Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine,
Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 L.
HUM. BEHAV. 501 (2010).
59. See infra notes 159–74 and accompanying text. R
60. Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 490.  Morain and Mello’s recent work suggests, as do the R
data gathered for this Article, that general support for a wide variety of new-frontier public
health law interventions exceeds 70% support for even the most invasive interventions and
moves into near unanimity (88.9%) for others. Id.  Only truly coercive hypothesized regimes (in
other words, ones that have never been credibly proposed by regulators or legislators) received
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there is not substantial prior research explicitly focused on linking in-
dividual sociodemographic variables with support of law in these do-
mains, I expected that marginalized ethnic groups and women will be
more supportive of public health law interventions than the general
public.
IV. SMOKING INTERVENTIONS
A. Theories of Smoking Interventions
Smoking interventions represented a response to a sociocultural
shift in attitudes toward the act of smoking itself.61  Whereas food and
diet related public health interventions seek to reduce health care
costs overall as a function of reducing poor food choices, smoking in-
terventions were first positioned as the government helping individu-
als protect themselves and their families from others’ harmful
behaviors that negatively impacted their health.62  Initial public health
interventions relating to smoking started, as many such interventions
do, at the local level.63  Local experimentation with law intervention,
along with vigorous advocacy and a national dialogue about smoking,
resulted in a variety of interventions ranging from clean air rules to
advertising restrictions.64
As national awareness of the health risks regarding firsthand and
secondhand smoke reaches an all-time high, “old” public health law
interventions with respect to smoking are no longer controversial and
weak support. Id.  Thus, while Morain and Mello find substantial opposition to public health law
interventions which “make possession of soda and other junk foods a disciplinary offense” in
public schools or “permit employers to test and fire for tobacco use,” the absence of a public
proposal to do this or even a public dialogue would naturally lead to intense public opposition if
respondents were hearing it for the first time. Id.
61. See, e.g., Raymond Leung et al., Instituting a Smoke-Free Policy for City Recreation Cen-
ters and Playgrounds, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2010, 10 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE E116
(July 11, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2013/pdf/12_0294.pdf (discussing efforts to ban
smoking in public spaces in Philadelphia and noting, “[k]ey areas of evidence in support of our
policy included . . . supporting a normative message that smoking is harmful, [and] motivating
smokers to quit” among others).
62. The first smoking interventions that provided for outright prohibitions were often located
in local health-centered establishments. See Diane M. Becker et al., The Impact of a Total Ban
on Smoking in the Johns Hopkins Children’s Center, 262 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 799, 799–800
(1989) (detailing and discussing a ban on smoking in a hospital); John P. Mullooly et al., Smok-
ing Behavior and Attitudes of Employees of a Large HMO Before and After a Work Site Ban on
Cigarette Smoking, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 623, 623 (1990) (HMO ban).
63. Kathleen Hoke Dachille, Using Law To Improve Public Health: The Example of Tobacco
Regulation, 17 NYSBA HEALTH L.J. 32, 32 (2012).
64. Id. at 32–33.
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are widely accepted.65  Therefore, public health advocates shifted
within this policy domain, calling for new and innovative measures
designed to further reduce the harm caused by direct and indirect con-
sumption of smoke.66  The arguments for protecting children from
secondhand smoke carry particular weight with the public because
children are viewed separately from the adult free-market sphere of
behavioral health choices.67  New smoking interventions rely less on
formal enforcement regimes and more on compliance by persuasion.
But, “no systematic literature exists on the number of fines that have
been imposed in the many locales that have enacted [public smoking]
bans[,]”68 rendering it difficult to determine if these regimes are gen-
erally effective.  On the other hand, attempts to limit smoking in pri-
vate spaces have received much pushback from critics and smokers
who view the efforts as overreaching governmental intrusion.
Building on prior limited interventions, lawmakers developed new
interventions focused not on educating the individual smoker, but in-
stead, on creating outright prohibitions and economic incentives to re-
duce the harm from smoking—writ large.  Some interventions take
the form of outright smoking bans across cities and states. Smoking
bans operate as a prohibition first and foremost.69  These are the anti-
nudges.  Yet a secondary effect of these prohibitions may also increase
awareness about the health hazards of the forbidden behavior, which
is a form of nudging nevertheless.  Lawmakers hope that through in-
creased awareness, the general public will adopt the principal mes-
sage—that smoking is an unhealthy behavior—and that they will act
on it by not smoking.70  The ultimate goal of smoking bans is twofold
65. Patrick Kabat, Note, “Till Naught but Ash Is Left To See”: Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot
Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y  L. & ETHICS 128, 130–31 (2009)
(outlining the developments in smoking legislation but cautioning that the shift in laws from
permissive to prohibitive should develop responsibly).
66. See, e.g., Jonathon P. Winickoff et al., Regulation of Smoking in Public Housing, 362 N.
ENG. J. MED. 2319, 2319, 2322 (2010) (outlining the potential policy reasons for having the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ban smoking in public housing).
67. Leung, et al., supra note 61 (“[S]moke-free policies support a normative message that R
smoking is unsafe and that nonsmokers have the right to be protected.  This is especially signifi-
cant for children because children are influenced by their perceptions of normal behavior.”).
68. Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Bachynski, Banning Smoking in Parks and on Beaches: Sci-
ence, Policy, and the Politics of Denormalization, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1297 (2013).
69. See Fabrizio Turoldo, Responsibility as an Ethical Framework for Public Health Interven-
tions, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1197, 1198 (2009).
70. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, SMOKE-FREE WORKPLACE LEGISLATION
WILL SAVE LIVES—AND IT WON’T HURT BUSINESS 5, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/smoke/sfaa-brief-book.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015) (“Smoke-free workplace legislation also
reduces the social acceptability of smoking, and therefore helps reduce smoking in general.”);
Leung, et al., supra note 61. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, EXECUTIVE R
SUMMARY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/smoke/shsmoke.pdf (last revised June
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 16 25-JAN-16 8:38
72 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:57
in this sense: (1) prohibit a certain behavior in a given context;71 and
(2) prevent or eliminate that behavior overall.  Indeed, smoking bans
have decreased individual smokers’ opportunities to smoke in many
settings, and therefore reduced their volume of smoking or inspired
them to quit or attempt to quit.72  Increased cigarette costs through
taxation have had similar effects.73  Overall, recent public health law
interventions regarding smoking seem inextricably linked to more
modern interventions with respect to both food and diet and youth
sports TBI laws because one key method of legal effect uniting them
is an effort to achieve compliance with the law’s goals without a signif-
icant deterrent or compliance regime standing behind it.74
B. Smoking Intervention Trends
Despite the abovementioned effects, new smoking-related public
health interventions have been some of the most contentious regula-
tions and laws across the country.75  Developing awareness about the
health hazards of smoking and secondhand smoke caused public
health advocates to propose bans on smoking in public places, regula-
tions prohibiting smoking in and around certain workplaces, and sug-
gesting smoking bans in some private places, such as in cars with
children.76  Several states banned workplace smoking statewide, in-
10, 2008) (“10% to 20% of smokers would quit if smoking were prohibited in their workplace.
Even among those who continue to smoke, average consumption would decrease by 6%.”).
71. The targeting of behavior, of course, triggers different self-interest mechanisms for inter-
ventions like antismoking initiatives when the behavior is directly aligned with self-interest and
personal identity.  Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 493. R
72. See Rong W. Zablocki et. al., Smoking Ban Policies and Their Influence on Smoking Be-
haviors Among Current California Smokers: A Population-Based Study, PREV. MED. 73 (2014).
73. See Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control Strategy, 21 TOBACCO
CONTROL 172, 179 (2012).
74. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan & Jerome Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without
Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 69 (Robert Rabin & Stephen
Sugarman eds., 1993).
75. See Joe Palazzolo, Appeals Court Rejects Challenge to Outdoor Smoking Ban, WALL ST. J.:
L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/11/08/appeals-court-rejects-chal-
lenge-to-outdoor-smoking-ban/. But see Rebecca Riffkin, Americans Favor Ban on Smoking in
Public, but Not Total Ban: Nineteen Percent Favor Making Smoking Totally Illegal in U.S., GAL-
LUP (July 30, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/174203/americans-favor-ban-smoking-public-not-
total-ban.aspx (last visited February 1, 2015) (discussing the fact that the majority of Americans
are in favor of making smoking in public illegal—something that the majority opposed until
2008).
76. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SMOKE-FREE POLICIES IMPROVE
HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/
improve_health/ (last updated May 12, 2014); AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND. OVERVIEW
LIST—HOW MANY SMOKEFREE LAWS? (July 1, 2015), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/mediaordlist
.pdf. But see Mark J. Horvick, Note, Examining the Underlying Purposes of Municipal and State-
wide Smoking Bans, 80 IND. L.J. 923, 924 (2005) (acknowledging the increasing incidence of
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cluding California77 and North Dakota.78  Within the past decade,
most of the sixty largest United States cities banned smoking in all
restaurants and bars.79
A variety of private actors also created bans in the workplace.80
But, despite many workplaces also banning smoking, exemptions for
adult-only establishments or private clubs, casinos, and small work-
places have prompted litigation and dissent.81  As a result, it is unclear
whether the public supports these new laws designed to prohibit indi-
vidual behaviors, and if so, how best to frame these laws and their
goals.82  Though a few studies have explored the public’s support for
smoking bans, discussing the motivations for these bans, but criticizing smoking bans as going
too far beyond protecting the only class of individuals who need governmental protection—
children).
77. CAL. LABOR CODE, §  6404.5 (West 2003); Horvick, supra note 76, at 925 (characterizing R
California as having “started the fire” for smoking bans).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 23-12-10 (2012).
79. Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1110,
1136–37 (2012) (discussing city smoking bans in the context of municipal policy choices); Paul A.
Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1219, 1225–36 (2014) (highlighting cities’ leadership in smoking-related public health
law interventions); AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., STATES, COMMONWEALTHS, AND TER-
RITORIES WITH 100% SMOKEFREE LAWS IN ALL NON-HOSPITALITY WORKPLACES, RESTAU-
RANTS, AND BARS, http://no-smoke.org/pdf/WRBLawsMap.pdf (last updated  July 1, 2015)
(describing broad trends for nonhospitality workplaces, restaurants, and bars); Anti-smoking
Laws Spreading in Large Cities, CHART (Nov. 15, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/
2012/11/15/anti-smoking-laws-spreading-in-large-cities/.
80. Leslie Zellers & Samantha K. Graff, Workplace Smoking: Options for Employees and
Legal Risks for Employers, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, Apr. 2008, at 1, 3, http://
ucanr.edu/sites/tobaccofree/files/175147.pdf. See generally M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Cor-
poration, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1518–19 (2009) (discussing how and why corporations may
regulate individual behaviors, including smoking and overeating, and analogizing these “nanny-
isms” to government regulation).
81. E.g., Office of Senate Floor Analyses, Bill Analysis, SB 575, 3d Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2011),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0551-0600/sb_575_cfa_20110601_124635_sen_
floor.html (supporting an amendment to legislation on smoking in the workplace, concluding
that there is no safe level of exposure to secondhand smoke and emphasizing that workplace
exposure disproportionately impacts low-income workers, young adults, and Latinos); Robert P.
Hagan, Comment, Restaurants, Bars and Workplaces, Lend Me Your Air: Smokefree Laws as
Private Property Exactions–The Undiscovered Country for Nollan and Dolan?, 22 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 143, 146–47 (2005) (criticizing the application of smoking bans to private
property); Steve Green, Judge Dismisses Second-Hand Smoke Lawsuit Against Caesars En-
tertainment, VEGAS INC (July 17, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/business/legal/2012/
jul/17/judge-dismisses-second-hand-smoke-lawsuit-against-/; Casino Employee in NJ Wins Can-
cer Suit for Second-Hand Smoke Forecasting a New Wave in Litigation, GELMANS (Feb. 20, 2008,
9:34 AM), http://www.gelmans.com/ReadingRoom/tabid/65/ctl/ArticleView/mid/372/articleId/76/
Casino-Employee-in-NJ-Wins-Cancer-Suit-for-Second-Hand-Smoke-Forecasting-a-New-Wave-
in-Litigation.aspx; Lung Cancer Victim Settles With A.C. Casino for $4.5M, NBC 10 PHILA. (Dec.
3, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Lung-Cancer-Victim-Settles-
With-Casino-for-45M-111272304.html.
82. See Horvick, supra note 76, at 931 (criticizing smoking bans as tyrannical paternalism). R
But see Marot Williamson, Comment, When One Person’s Habit Becomes Everyone’s Problem:
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smoking restrictions,83 none have done so across multiple domains or
within the time frame most salient for recent public health law and
policy interventions.  Therefore, the survey discussed in this Article
engaged two proposed smoking-centered public health law innova-
tions to gauge overall public support and serve as empirical baselines
for studying the nudge-based interventions discussed in the following
Parts.
C. Smoking Interventions—Survey Questions and Results
The survey presented respondents with two questions about pro-
posed public health law interventions with respect to smoking rooted
in a series of recently proposed or enacted interventions.  The ques-
tions were framed to explicitly raise the messenger’s (the government)
awareness of these laws as well as the political choice set presented by
adoption of these laws, which both explicitly make clear that the pro-
posed intervention will restrict individual choice in public and private
spaces to benefit either the general public or children.
Questions:
1. Recently, New York City enacted a law designed to eliminate
smoking in most public places, including parks, playgrounds,
beaches and large open pedestrian plazas like Times Square.  If
such a new law were proposed where you live, how would you
describe your level of support?
2. Recently, some have called for new laws to protect children
against secondhand smoke.  If your state was considering a
mandatory law banning drivers and passengers from smoking in
cars where children under 18 are passengers, how would you de-
scribe your level of support?
Responses were coded on a Likert scale from 1: strongly support the
law to 7: strongly oppose the law.  Mean responses for both proposals
(city ban: 2.47 (se .046) and car ban: 2.17 (se .041)) were substantially
in favor of the proposed interventions, suggesting generally strong
The Battle over Smoking Bans in Bars and Restaurants, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 176,
185–86 (2007) (praising smoking bans in private bars and clubs as attracting new customers and
highlighting the ultimate economic benefits in health care costs).
83. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Doucet et al., Demographic Differences in Support for Smoking Pol-
icy Interventions, 32 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 148, 150 (2007); Mary Kay Rayens et al., Public Support
for Smoke-Free Laws in Rural Communities, 34 AM. J. PREV. MED. 519 (2008); George Thomp-
son & Nick Wilson, Public Attitudes to Laws for Smoke-Free Private Vehicles: A Brief Review, 18
TOBACCO CONTROL 256 (2009).
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public support for each of them, perhaps even stronger than previ-
ously realized by advocates for further interventions in this space.
D. Conclusion—Smoking Interventions and Public Opinion
Support for the interventions described above was fairly strong de-
spite the somewhat invasive nature of the interventions.  Thus, this
support provides further evidence that: (1) coercive and deterrent re-
gimes still remain generally popular; (2) there is large-scale political
will for further interventions in this policy space; and (3) further re-
search is needed to determine whether interventions that target chil-
dren within a particular policy space are viewed more favorably than
those that do not.  These baseline numbers provide a useful control
for evaluating public opinion about more recent new frontier inter-
ventions to which this Article now turns.
V. FOOD AND DIET INTERVENTIONS
A. Theories of Food and Diet Interventions
Although food and diet have long been discussed within the public-
health community with respect to their contributions to a growing
obesity epidemic, these discussions did not focus on applying legal in-
terventions to solve the problem.84  Most law-based interventions in
this domain are of fairly modern vintage and have been restricted to
two broad approaches: (1) the legal prohibition of certain types of
food and drink, either generally or for specific populations; and (2) an
attempt to modify behavior through legally mandated education—
such as requirements for restaurants to list calorie counts next to food
items.85  The first type of prohibition is neither a deterrent nor a coer-
cion, yet modifies behavior by eliminating certain choices.  The second
intervention, a nudge, focuses on calorie counts and attempts to im-
pact individual behaviors by raising awareness about the existence of
calorie counts on restaurant menus and in other food retail contexts
by making choice sets more salient.86  The calorie count requirements
84. See, e.g., Lester Breslow, Public Health Aspects of Weight Control, 42 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1116, 1119 (1952) (describing two suggested approaches to the public health problem of weight
control).
85. See generally David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternal-
ism, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1687 (2014) (questioning whether nudge-based “paternal” regulations can
be sufficient to induce sufficient behavioral changes at the individual level).
86. Some theorists, applying an economic-theory framework to these interventions, would de-
scribe this sort of intervention as “first best”—targeting a limited market failure with a choice-
framing structure and limiting the second-order effects of maintaining that structure.  Prabhat
Jha et al., The Economic Rationale for Intervention in the Tobacco Market, in TOBACCO CON-
TROL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153, 153–54 (Prabhat Jha & Frank J. Chaloupka eds., 2000).
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also try to influence individual food consumption behaviors by shap-
ing attitudes toward high calorie foods, identifying negative social
norms about high calorie foods and poor food choices, and highlight-
ing the ability of individuals to make better choices for themselves or
at least be aware of the food choices they make.87  Finally, calorie
count laws and the requirements they place on food retailers create
social meaning for society at large and individual consumers by high-
lighting calorie counting and food consumption choices as a national
public health issue.
The reason for these recent interventions is obvious to any casual
observer.88  Today’s food and diet related public health interventions
in cities and states across the country grew out of an understanding
that individuals have become less healthy with respect to food behav-
iors.  The availability of cheap, easy, and frequently deep-fat-fried,
fast-food options has supplanted the now distant tradition of home
cooked meals.89  Not only are the choices presented becoming less
healthy, but individuals are also making poorer choices more fre-
quently.90  Some consumer populations are captive markets; public
school students often have no real option but to accept what is fed to
them by school cafeterias where the bottom line effectively dictates
that adults make choices for children regardless of whether those
choices are optimal.91  State interventions seek to restrict or modify
this choice set through a variety of methods and for a few key
reasons.92
87. Alan R. Kristal et al., Trends in Food Label Use Associated with New Nutrition Labeling
Regulations, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1212, 1212, 1214–15 (1998) (showing a small effect of these
labels on consumption).
88. Among contributors to causes of death in the United States, poor diet (26%), high body
mass index (14%), and physical inactivity (8.8%) are all among the top ten.  U.S. Burden of
Disease Collaborators, The State of U.S. Health, 1990–2010: Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and
Risk Factors, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 591, 596 (2013).
89. See Joanne F. Guthrie et al., Role of Food Prepared Away from Home in the American
Diet, 1977–78 versus 1994–96: Changes and Consequences, 34 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 140, 142
(2002) (finding that out-of-home dining rose from 18% in the 1970s to 32% by the 1990s).
90. Id. at 140.
91. See Melissa Mortazavi, Consuming Identities: Law, School Lunches, and What It Means To
Be American, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2014) (discussing the social and political
impact of food legislation in the school lunch context). See generally Rebecca L Goldberg, No
Such Thing as a Free Lunch: Paternalism, Poverty, and Food Justice, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
35 (2013) (addressing the policy intersection between anti-obesity and food justice advocates);
Rebecca Edwalds, Note, Restructuring Local School Wellness Policies: Amending the Kids Act
To Fight Childhood Obesity, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1051 (2014) (examining, critiquing, and
proposing amendments to current federal laws regarding childhood obesity).
92. See, Mitchell Landsberg & Monte Morin, School Soda, Junk Food Bans Approved, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/07/local/me-junkfood7.
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Recognizing that children and adults alike were suffering increas-
ingly severe health consequences from food and diet related behav-
iors, public health advocates pivoted to these new interventions to
more directly impact health outcomes.  Some interventions were
prompted by grassroots organizing, such as schools responding to par-
ent petitions to improve the quality of school lunches.93  Other inter-
ventions responded to burgeoning health care costs imposed on state
and local budgets.94  Because food and diet behaviors of individuals
directly cause, contribute to, or exacerbate conditions such as heart
disease, stroke, and diabetes, lawmakers have a variety of economic
incentives to use public health law interventions to coerce optimal be-
havior thereby reducing budget expenditures.  But, most of these in-
terventions simply nudge the public.  If the public supports these laws,
listens to the implicit and explicit government communications about
the effects of these laws, and understands the individual benefits of
diet and health behavioral changes, then the expected public health
outcomes should follow.95  Thus, none of these diet-related public
health law interventions rely directly on deterrence theory, legitimacy,
or even direct economic incentives,96 providing a useful baseline met-
ric for applying an individual level, sociodemographic, political psy-
chology approach to law support and behavior adoption and rejection.
B. Food and Diet Intervention Trends
The public health interventionist model in the obesity space is best
captured by the efforts of large-scale and visible government interven-
tions, such as those of New York City during the past fifteen years.97
93. See e.g., Mortazavi, supra note 91, at 42. R
94. For example, New York City’s public-health department conducted a cost-benefit analysis
to determine whether its proposed soda-ban would create significant municipal budget savings.
See, e.g., In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014).
95. But see Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government’s Use of Neg-
ative Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 227, 228, 230 (2013) (expres-
sing skepticism that paternalistic public health interventions will succeed in their goals).
96. But, research and experiments in this space suggest that economic incentives may indeed
change behavior with or without a law-mandated educational regime. See, e.g., Etienne J.
Phipps et al., Impact of a Rewards-Based Incentive Program on Promoting Fruit and Vegetable
Purchases, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Jan. 2015, at 166, 169–71  (describing the results of a study that
provided financial incentives for low-income residents to eat healthier).
97. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 79, at 1136–37 (discussing the “meteoric” rise of menu-labeling R
legislation); Thomas R. Frieden et al., Public Health in New York City, 2002–2007: Confronting
Epidemics of the Modern Era, 37 INT. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 966 (2008); see also Sara Jo Dunstan,
Comment, Big Brother Takes a Bite out of the Big Apple and Gets a Worm: Can Any Govern-
ment Body Regulate Portions?, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 553, 555, 556–58 (2014) (discussing New York
City’s proposed soda ban); Hery (Michelle) Min, Note, Large-Sized Soda Ban as an Alternative
to Soda Tax, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190–92 (2013) (discussing the same).
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Of these varied interventions, those focused on the nexus between
sugary soda and obesity, and between the quantity of consumption
and overall obesity, provide the firmest ground for further study.98
Interventions with respect to outright prohibitions about the types
of food that can be purchased or sold are obviously rare.  The sole
exception revolves around sweetened beverages and efforts to restrict
sales generally or in communities at risk for overconsumption.  Fur-
ther, these interventions are typically focused on marginalized or po-
litically underrepresented populations, such as those receiving
government assistance, which raises questions about whether soci-
odemographic membership correlates with the application of coercive,
rather than persuasive, approaches to health behavior modification.99
The broader soda law intervention movement developed in two
parts: (1) an effort to restrict sales within schools; and (2) an effort to
restrict sales more generally.100  A more limited set of restrictions tied
to the location of machines in areas with school-age populations has
proven more successful.  Soda bans in schools have faced somewhat
less opposition and are in place in large states such as California101
and Texas,102 as well as large cities in smaller states, like Maine.103
Building on this movement to restrict overly sugary beverages through
outright legal prohibition, governing officials of various school sys-
98. Of course, there are a variety of other interventions in this space, but they will not be fully
discussed in this Article. See, e.g., James G. Hodge et al., New Frontiers in Obesity Control:
Innovative Public Health Legal Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2013)
(reviewing current public health law interventions addressing obesity); Kevin W. Ryan et al.,
Arkansas Fights Fat: Translating Research into Policy to Combat Childhood and Adolescent
Obesity, 25 HEALTH AFF. 992 (2006) (reviewing Arkansas’ creation of state coalitions to gather
the best evidence to devise the best anti-obesity policies).
99. See, e.g., Nancy Kass et al., Ethics and Obesity Prevention: Ethical Considerations in 3
Approaches to Reducing Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, May
2014, at 787, 791 (2014) (“[these approaches send] a public policy message that poor people
require government intervention to manage their food choices whereas higher-income persons
do not.”).
100. A more recent movement to tax soda and a variety of other beverages shall not be dis-
cussed here because they are in their nascent stages and thus lack long-term trend evidence.
However, they may prove to be a fruitful line of alternative inquiry in the future if these mea-
sures are adopted and prove more successful. See, e.g., Amanda Covarrubias, Results Mixed on
California Soda Taxes, Fracking, Marijuana Measures, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, http://www.la-
times.com/la-me-pol-election-notbeook-20141106-story.html (describing efforts in 2014 to enact
soda taxes in Berkeley and San Francisco, California).
101. Tom Fudge, California Bans Soda in Schools, KPBS (July 1, 2009), http://www.kpbs.org/
news/2009/jul/01/california-bans-soda-schools/.
102. Eva Ruth Moravec, Sugary Drinks Banned from Texas Schools, HOUST. CHRON.: TEX.
POL. (May 21, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/texaspolitics/2013/05/sugary-drinks-banned-from-
texas-schools/.
103. Caroline Cornish, Portland Schools Ban Soda Sales, Aim for Healthier Snacks, WLBZ2
(Aug. 17, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://archive.wlbz2.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=211089.
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tems in California, Colorado, Florida, Washington, and West Virginia
have also considered banning, or have banned, flavored milk.104  Still,
other jurisdictions are engaging the issue by further restricting choice
through law, such as banning “junk food” more generally, and thus
shifting student consumption behavior.105
Extending this reasoning, former New York City mayor, Michael
Bloomberg, proposed a broader intervention in May 2012.106  The
proposed amendment to New York City’s Health Code included an
explicit statement of legislative purpose highlighting the public health
impact goals of the law.107  The intervention was straightforward:
through regulation, the City would prohibit fast-food vendors from
selling sugary drinks in containers larger than sixteen ounces.  The
message to the public was also straightforward.  Obesity was a public
health epidemic in New York City, sugary drinks and a lack of vigor-
ous physical activity were direct causes of obesity, and, moreover, the
government could improve the public health by eliminating one
source of the problem: large portions of sugary drinks. 108
The model for this intervention would be the elimination of individ-
ual choice by regulation and promotion of a behavioral shift either by
the general reduction in consumption of all sugary beverages (regard-
less of size) or by the choice of consumers to engage in obesity-reduc-
ing behavior, such as exercise or the complete elimination of sugary
drinks in personal diets.  Thus, the intervention provided for both a
formal legal prohibition to improve public health as well as an educa-
104. Christina Hoag, More Schools Consider Flavored Milk Bans, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9,
2011, 9:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/09/flavored-milk-in-schools-_n_859311
.html.
105. See, e.g., Landsberg & Morin, supra note 92 (discussing two California bills to make R
lunches and snacks healthier by limiting the sale of junk food on school campuses). See generally
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COMPETITIVE FOODS AND BEVERAGES IN U.S.
SCHOOLS: A STATE POLICY ANALYSIS (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/nutrition/pdf/
compfoodsbooklet.pdf.
106. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AN AMEND-
MENT (§ 81.53) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH (Mar. 12, 2013), http://
rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/establishing-maximum-size-sugary-drinks-0.
107. Id.  The amendment’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose” does two things: (1) it outlines
the following main food and diet-related problems: ((a) “Obesity is epidemic among New
Yorkers and the consequences are devastating”; (b) “Sugary drinks are a leading driver of the
obesity epidemic and are associated with dangerous chronic diseases”; (c) “New Yorkers are
consuming excessive quantities of sugary drinks”; (d) “Portion sizes are increasing – and bigger
portions lead to greater consumption of sugary drinks”) and (2) it identifies the solutions and
goals of the proposed intervention: “[t]he purpose of the amendment is to address the obesity
epidemic among the City’s residents by limiting the maximum size of sugary beverages . . . .” Id.
108. Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale of Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-
large-sugared-drinks.html?_r=1.
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tion–information model: changing public behavior through education
and government persuasion.
New York City’s interventionist approach was met with strong resis-
tance from industry groups and those who critiqued the power of big
government interventions regardless of the issue.109  Public communi-
cations about the city’s intervention were primarily limited to city offi-
cials and public health advocates who engaged the issue in the press.
Soda manufacturers, an obvious and major opponent of the law, ar-
gued in a preemptive lawsuit that the proposed law was “an end-run
around the City Council, reflecting an overreaching ‘nanny adminis-
tration.’”110  A New York state appellate court ruled that the city’s
“Board of Health exceeded the scope of its regulatory authority by
adopting” the soda ban.111  New York City’s attempts to limit sales of
large-sized sodas were first enjoined, and then ultimately abandoned,
as a result of court decisions.112  One reviewing court reasoned that
“an administrative agency exceeds its authority when it makes difficult
choices between public policy ends, rather than finds means to an end
chosen by the Legislature.”113  Despite this judicial rejection of one
food and diet intervention, food and diet interventions can still take
divergent forms rooted in “nudge” like approaches.  For example,
while a soda-ban proposal may not typically be thought of as a
“nudge-based” intervention, a calorie-count proposal would be.114
Public health law interventions with respect to calorie counts are
also of fairly recent vintage and rely on an assumption that the public
supports these interventions, pays attention to the information pro-
vided, and understands how to correctly use calorie counts in a man-
ner that can lead to better consumption decisions.115  Calorie count
and menu labeling requirements have been enacted frequently in re-
109. Id.
110. Declaratory Judgment Petition of Plaintiff-Petitioner at 1. In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d
200 (2013).
111. In re N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d. 538, 549 (N.Y. 2014).
112. Michael M. Grynbaum, New York’s Ban on Big Sodas Is Rejected by Final Court, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/nyregion/city-loses-final-appeal-on-
limiting-sales-of-large-sodas.html.
113. In re N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 549.
114. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 262.
115. See Lauren F. Gizzi, Comment, State Menu-Labeling Legislation: A Dormant Giant Wait-
ing To Be Awoken by Commerce Clause Challenges, 58 CATH. U.L. REV. 501, 514–19 (2009)
(discussing contemporary city and state menu-labeling legislation efforts and the motivations
behind them—for example, noting that the Board of Health rationalized New York City’s menu
labeling law based on its duty to “prevent[ ] and control[ ] diseases” and its “interest in consum-
ers’ informed decision-making”).
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cent years.  Cities such as New York City,116 Philadelphia, and Seattle,
as well as states such as California,117 Maine, and Oregon indepen-
dently created laws requiring certain food vendors to display calorie
counts.  Seattle passed a city ordinance requiring chain restaurants to
post calorie counts for all menu items, and research showed this menu
labeling impacted caloric content of these items.118  Further, the effect
of these interventions impacted consumers in a variety of ways, in-
cluding some chain restaurants reducing portion sizes and modifying
recipes to include lower-calorie ingredients.119  Other states that have
considered similar interventions include: Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washing-
ton.120  Yet the effect of these interventions on actual behavior is
decidedly uncertain.121
Public health law interventions in this domain also include federal
action, which is unlike other public health law interventions discussed
in this Article.  Prompted by a much debated provision in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),122 certain food retailers
moved toward labeling calorie counts for products.123  Changes in the
chain food retail sector first occurred because the ACA’s language
specified that chain restaurants above a certain size would eventually
be subject to calorie count provisions. 124  Some smaller independent
food retailers have now begun to participate in the change volunta-
116. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund J Brown, Governor Signs Legislation Pro-
moting Nutrition and Healthier Options, http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=10700 (last visited July
19, 2015) (quoting Gov. Schwarzenegger’s introductory comments on California’s menu-labeling
law, highlighting that the law would allow people to “make informed decisions about what to
eat” in restaurants that “will lead to healthier options on the menu and it will benefit all of the
people”).
117. L.R., Menu Labelling: New York’s Calorie Counting, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2011, 12:14
PM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/07/menu-labelling.
118. Sarah Kliff, Study: After Menu Labeling, Healthier Restaurant Offerings, WASH. POST
(July 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/19/study-after-
menu-labeling-healthier-restaurant-offerings/.
119. Id.
120. Matthew Gever, Legislators Counting on Nutrition Information to Curb Obesity, 29
STATE HEALTH NOTES, Sept. 15 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/health/shn/
shn523.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Ef-
fects on Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (Web Exclusive
2009).
122. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012)) (“Nutrition labeling of standard menu items at
chain restaurants”).
123. See, e.g., McDonald’s USA Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu Items, MCDONALDS.COM
(July 19, 2015), http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/getnutrition/nutritionfacts.pdf.
124. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, § 4205.
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rily.125  The FDA recently issued new rules for menu labeling require-
ments to expand the existing requirements used in chain restaurants
nationwide, even though the efficacy of these interventions is
uncertain.126
Thus, most of these interventions share one of two key features: (1)
elimination of a negative source of diet as a source of harm reduction;
or (2) a more visible (forced) form of individual education about the
calorie content of one’s diet.127  And, though other studies have ex-
plored the public’s support for calorie counts,128 few studies have
done so across multiple domains or within the time frame most salient
for the FDA’s recent rulemaking.  Therefore, this Section seeks to an-
swer some basic questions about the public’s support for these inter-
ventions, including whether the public supports them and whether the
law’s “education as intervention” function works as intended.
C. Food and Diet Interventions—Survey Questions and Results
Survey respondents were presented with three questions about pro-
posed public health law interventions.  These interventions were
framed to raise awareness of the explicit political choice set and rea-
soning that were presented as justifying the interventions.
1. Food and Diet Questions
Some people say that the government should create laws that will
help people eat healthier food and lead healthier lives, while others
say that government should not interfere in an individual’s choice
about how to live—or how to eat.  Here are a few laws about health
and food choices that have been or may be proposed where you
live.  For each, please indicate how you would feel about such a law
being enacted.
Respondents were then provided with three question frameworks
about a variety of public health interventions, tied to the interventions
discussed above.
125. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Calorie Counts: Coming to a Restaurant, Movie Theater, Vending




127. A more charitable framing might suggest that the display of information helps to shape
norms or behaviors by changing the default option. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 7–8. R
128. See, e.g., Amir Goren et al., Predicting Support for Restricting Food Marketing to Youth,
29 HEALTH AFF. 419 (2010); J. Eric Oliver & Taeku Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of
Obesity in America, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 923 (2005); Christina A. Roberto et al., Ratio-
nale and Evidence for Menu-Labeling Legislation, 37 AM. J. PREV. MED. 546 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 27 25-JAN-16 8:38
2015] NUDGING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 83
1. Requiring fast-food restaurants, such as McDonald’s, to post cal-
orie counts on their menus.
2. Requiring sit-down chain restaurants, such as Red Lobster,
Chili’s, or Applebee’s, to post calorie counts on their menus.
3. Eliminating soda machines from public schools and other public
facilities frequented by children.
Responses were coded on a Likert scale from 1: strongly support the
law, to 7: strongly oppose the law.
Respondents overwhelmingly supported each of the three proposed
interventions, with policy support means as follows:
TABLE 1. FOOD AND DIET INTERVENTIONS (MEAN RESPONSES)
Proposed Intervention Response Mean Std. Error
Fast-Food Calorie Counts 2.29 0.039
Sit-Down Calorie Counts 2.41 0.039
Soda Ban 2.75 0.044
Respondents were then asked a follow-up question about whether
they would actually use calorie count information as public health law
advocates would hope: to alter behavior and inform and improve din-
ing habits, particularly outside of the home.
2. Calorie Count Question
When calorie information is available for your meal or snack
choices when you eat out at fast-food or sit-down restaurants, do
you:
1. Read it and use it to make choices about what to eat.
2. Read it and consider it as a small factor in what to eat.
3. Read it but don’t really use it at all.
4. Don’t read it or don’t eat out.
Responses to the above question can be grouped into three calorie
count “use” categories: routine use, partial use, or rare and nonuse
(collapsing choices 3 and 4 above).  Of the 2,027 respondents, only 822
(40.55%) responded that this information is routinely both read and
utilized, while 509 (25.11%) responded that they either rarely or never
use the information.  Even the 696 (34.34%) partial users indicated
that their use of the information was just one of many factors in their
decision-making calculus.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 28 25-JAN-16 8:38
84 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:57
D. Conclusion—Food and Diet Interventions and Public Opinion
The results above suggest that information in this policy space, by
itself, is unlikely to change the majority of the public’s behavior in this
domain.129  Yet this individual rejection of information strongly con-
trasts with public support for the provision of the information, which
leads to a conundrum.  Public health advocates and policy makers
continue to pursue this type of intervention (due to a lack of public
resistance to the policy) even as the public passively expresses this
resistance (with respect to individual behavior).
Thus, the abovementioned responses suggest broad support (medi-
ated by varying strength) for a variety of education-based public
health law interventions, including one that contains both an explicit
prohibition on behavior (soda bans) as well as a subtle implicit norm-
ing component (by removing soda machines, the public will become
aware that overconsumption of soda by children is harmful or nega-
tive and will adjust behavior accordingly).  But, the value of interven-
tions may be minimized if the intervention is centered on the
provision of information to educate the public and encourage behav-
ioral change, and the public, by and large, does not want to utilize this
information to inform its behavior.  Further, interventions targeted at
more vulnerable populations, children for example, did not receive an
expected commensurate increase in public support compared to the
calorie-count interventions (targeted at adults), despite the perception
that the public supports a more paternal public health approach for
younger populations.  In short, these results provide some initial,
broad explanations for why these interventions have not been shown
to substantially affect the public.130
Perhaps the somewhat voluntary nature of the food and diet inter-
ventions, coupled with the focus on vulnerable populations, might ac-
count for widespread support.  Nonetheless, support for the control
intervention (smoking) is similar to support for the nudge-based food
and diet intervention.  But, taking the public’s overwhelming support
as a positive sign for interventionists, even if the law’s efficacy is un-
certain, we might then expand the analysis by broadening the scope of
129. E.g., Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Mandatory Menu Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain in
King County, Washington, 40 AM. J. PREV. MED. 122, 126 (2011) (finding little evidence of a
local calorie-count law changing consumer behavior for one restaurant); Pooja S. Tandon et al.,
The Impact of Menu Labeling on Fast-Food Purchases for Children and Parents, 41 AM. J. PREV.
MED.  434, 435 (2011) (finding that a menu-label regulation increased awareness but not the
amount of calories purchased and consumed).
130. E.g., Helen L. Walls et al., Public Health Campaigns and Obesity - a Critique, 11 BMC
PUB. HEALTH 136, 136 (2011), http://www.biomedicalcenttral.com/1471-2458/11/136 (finding lit-
tle evidence regarding the efficacy of these interventions).
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intervention.  If the public is relatively accepting of this law interven-
ing in areas with clear public health costs and consequences, how
might it respond to new initiatives in an area for which the public’s
awareness of these costs and consequences is less certain?
So, with respect to youth sports TBI laws, should we expect the
public’s support to be weaker given the relative novelty of these inter-
ventions or stronger given their focus on children?  With respect to
the relatively new nature of these interventions, if support for more
innovative public health law interventions is in part a function of time,
these interventions should receive less support.131  Further, if the in-
terventions are unfamiliar, less voluntary, or intrude on a perceived
sacred sphere, perhaps they will receive less support.  On the other
hand, if we expect resistance to these interventions to be a function of
the degree of paternalism in the nudge, this resistance should be mini-
mized when the intervention is directed at a more vulnerable popula-
tion: children.  To test these assumptions and to include a more direct
measurement of the likelihood that public support for public health
law interventions could be increased through the use of either trusted
messengers or the insertion of scientific data in the dissemination of
policy, two survey experiments were conducted as described in Part
VI.132
VI. YOUTH SPORTS TBI LAWS—ASSESSING SUPPORT FOR
INTERVENTION BY MESSENGER AND MESSAGE
A. Theories of Youth Sports Interventions
Youth sports TBI laws, an intervention of relatively recent vintage,
rely on a combination of proscriptive techniques as well as a familiar
choice-optimizing framework delivered through mandatory education
requirements.  Generally speaking, youth sports TBI laws attempt to
impact individual behaviors indirectly by raising awareness about the
potential harm of TBIs on youth who participate in organized
sports.133  This awareness can be highlighted to both youth sports par-
131. But see Jim Travers, Michigan Motorcycle Injury Claims Rise with Helmet Law Repeal,
CONSUMER REP. (June 03, 2013, 03:08 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2013/06/
michigan-motorcycle-injury-claims-rise-with-helmet-law-repeal/index.htm (describing the partial
repeal of a motorcycle helmet law and commensurate rise in injury claims).
132. See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text. R
133. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2014). Known as the Zackery Lystedt Law,
this was the first broad youth sports TBI law. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 15, at 290. The
Lystedt Law begins with a section discussing the prevalence and significance of concussions and
head injuries in young athletes.  Many states followed and enacted a youth sports TBI law
modeled on this one, and all state laws have included a preamble highlighting the potentially
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 30 25-JAN-16 8:38
86 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:57
ticipants and their parents.134  Youth sports TBI laws also try to influ-
ence individual youth sports behaviors by shaping attitudes toward
new or improved safety measures, identifying negative social norms
about unsafe sporting behaviors, and highlighting the ability of indi-
viduals to influence choices made by youth sports participants,
coaches, and parents.  Finally, youth sports TBI laws and the require-
ments they place on youth sports organizers and participants create
social meaning for the general public and individual participants by
highlighting youth sports TBIs as a national public health issue worthy
of increased public health attention and concomitant legal regimes.135
B. Youth Sports Intervention Trends
Beginning in the late 2000s,136 a heightened recognition of the po-
tentially devastating consequences of secondary-impact brain injuries
in youth sports led to the rapid enactment of youth sports TBI laws
across the country.  The greater visibility about stories of injured
youth athletes, coupled with the support of an array of outside interest
groups, led lawmakers to pass these laws at a fairly quick pace.  Af-
fected youth athletes, their families, lobbyists, and legislators worked
together to develop youth sports TBI laws that used education and
voluntary behavioral shifts as the primary method of achieving opti-
mal results.137  However, these laws significantly overlooked the do-
main of primary prevention, which would have ultimately required a
more coercive approach and would have likely included restrictions
not previously contemplated by the general public.138
catastrophic consequences of concussions. See Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health,
14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 66 (2014).
134. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:40-41.1 (2013) (calling for “athletes, coaches, and parents and
guardians” to become “educated about the nature and treatment of concussions and other
sports-related head injuries”).
135. See, e.g., id. (noting in the preamble to the state’s youth sports TBI law, legislative find-
ings highlight CDC data on sports-related concussions).
136. But see David Orentlicher & William S. David, Concussion and Football: Failures to Re-
spond by the NFL and the Medical Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 23, 29–35 (2013) (describing a lag
between the growing scientific consensus and the slow adoption of changes to policy and practice
with respect to concussions).
137. See generally Erin P. Andrews, Note, Avoiding the Technical Knockout: Tackling the In-
adequacies of Youth Concussion Legislation, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417 (2013/2014) (discussing
the differences, ambiguities, and inadequacies in current state legislation).
138. These laws also do not resolve the tension between the science of concussions and the
quality of protective equipment. See Brian Gruley, The Truth About the Safety Ratings That Sell
Football Helmets, BLOOMBERG: BUS. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2015-01-28/the-controversial-safety-ratings-that-sell-football-helmets.  See generally Samuel D.
Hodge & Shilpa Kadoo, A Heads-Up on Traumatic Brain Injuries in Sports, 17 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 155 (2014) (noting the ineffectiveness of the existing array of youth sports TBI
guidelines).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 31 25-JAN-16 8:38
2015] NUDGING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 87
From 2009 to 2014, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
passed laws designed to minimize the consequences of youth sports
TBIs.139  The first youth sports TBI law, created by Washington State,
was prompted by the severe injury of one specific youth athlete.140
Subsequent state laws mirrored the initial Washington law but were
also shaped by NFL lobbying and legislative influence.141  These laws
are organized around three core elements: (1) annual education of
athletes and parents; (2) mandatory removal of athletes suspected of
having a TBI from play; and (3) clearance by a designated health pro-
fessional before an athlete with a TBI can return to play.142  In addi-
tion to these state law developments, public opinion and sentiment
about the appropriate scope of intervention was also influenced by
highly publicized lawsuits between professional football players and
the National Football League (NFL).143  Similar suits were filed by
players in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),144
National Hockey League (NHL),145 Fe´de´ration Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA),146 and high school football leagues.147
139. Harvey, supra note 133; LAWATLAS, http://lawatlas.org/query?dataset=sc-reboot (last up-
dated May 1, 2015) (noting that as of May 2015, every state and the District of Columbia passed
a law intended to protect youth athletes from repeat TBIs).
140. Sheila Mickool, The Story Behind the Zackery Lystedt Law, SEATTLE MAG., Fall/Winter
2012, http://www.seattlemag.com/article/story-behind-zackery-lystedt-law.
141. See Harvey, supra note 133, at 98–99.
142. Hosea H. Harvey, Reducing Traumatic Brain Injuries in Youth Sports: Youth Sports
Traumatic Brain Injury State Laws, January 2009–December 2012, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e1,
e2 (2013).
143. Patrick Hruby, The NFL Dodges on Brain Injuries, ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www
.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/09/the-nfls-concussion-settlement-not-acceptable/
379557/; see also Daniel Gandert & Esther Kim, The NFL’s Headache: Issues with California
Workers’ Compensation for Continuous Head Traumas in Former Professional Football Players,
45 U. TOL. L. REV. 57, 57 (2013) (“Head traumas have become an increasingly visible problem
for the NFL.”).
144. NCAA Settles Head-Injury Lawsuit, ESPN (July 29, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/11279710/ncaa-settles-head-injury-lawsuit-create-70-million-fund. See generally
Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence: The NCAA Concussion Management Plan and Its
Limitations, 21 SPORTS L.J. 1, 8–26 (2014) (addressing inadequacies and limitations of the
NCAA’s concussion policies and comparing them to state and federal legislation); K. Adam
Pretty, Note, Dropping the Ball: The Failure of the NCAA To Address Concussions in College
Football, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2359, 2361–67 (2014) (highlighting the failure of the NCAA
to respond to medical professional, institutional, and societal pressures to improve their organi-
zational concussion policies).
145. Chris Peters, NHL Hit with Another Class-Action Suit Tied to Brain Injuries, CBS:
SPORTS (July 30, 2014, 6:49 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/eye-on-hockey/24643748/nhl-hit-
with-another-class-action-suit-tied-to-brain-injuries.
146. Darren Heitner, Class Action Concussion Lawsuit Filed Against FIFA and U.S. Soccer
Associations, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/
2014/08/27/class-action-concussion-lawsuit-filed-against-fifa-and-u-s-soccer-associations/.
147. Sarah Ganim, Class-Action Lawsuit Filed over High School Football, CNN, http://edition
.cnn.com/2014/12/01/us/concussion-lawsuit-high-school-football/ (last updated Dec. 2, 2014).
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As with the other interventions discussed supra, I designed a set of
survey questions to test whether the public would support a particular
set of public health law interventions in this policy domain and
whether there was variance across sociodemographic group responses
depending on the nature and scope of the intervention.  But, unlike
the domains discussed supra, public opinion about these interventions
was gauged through a series of experiments designed to capitalize on
previous findings and alter methods of communicating changes in law
and the scientific basis for the intervention.
With respect to the within-survey experiments infra, a few key find-
ings were expected. Because Americans have a wide variety of news
source groups, which evidence suggests influence individual opinion, I
expected to find that as the messenger of the proposed intervention
changes, so too will the overall level of support for the intervention.148
Three groups of messengers were identified: (1) public health advo-
cates or groups; (2) doctors or physician groups; and (3) Michelle
Obama or other political figures.  It was expected that support for the
intervention would be tied to individual beliefs about the efficacy of
the messenger such that political figures would have the least impact,
doctors the most impact, and public health advocates occupying an
uncertain center.149  Further, Michelle Obama was chosen as an ap-
propriate messenger because of her visibility within this space as well
as to test whether ideological opposition to her—as a person—would
be associated with either reduced policy support or reduced law com-
pliance.150  With respect to the experiment about the value of addi-
tional information influencing public opinion toward adoption of a
new intervention, it was expected that smokers, above all, would be
the most resistant to new scientific information for a variety of rea-
sons.  Put differently, most Americans rely on a trusted figure for in-
148. But see Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1955 (2011) (suggesting that the intervention is assessed broadly and in relationship
to individual conceptions of citizenship and that the messenger (state versus federal govern-
ment) may not be as salient as expected).
149. Background questions in the survey indicated that more than 75% of survey respondents
received health information from their doctor, notwithstanding the complicated nature of that
relationship. See Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL’Y 331 (2008) (explaining a physician’s fiduciary duty to his patient and examining the
role of a doctor as an advocate).  No other methods of gathering information were consistent
across even 50% of the survey subpopulation.
150. See James Oliphant, Conservatives Heap Criticism on Michelle Obama’s Campaign
Against Childhood Obesity, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 27, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.cleveland
.com/nation/index.ssf/2011/02/conservatives_heap_criticism_o.html; Kathleen Parker, Opinion,
Michelle Obama’s ‘Let’s Move Goes Too Far, WASH. POST, May 30, 2014, http://www.washington
post.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-michelle-obamas-lets-move-goes-too-far/2014/05/30/082576
70-e832-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.
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formation, and thus, this experiment provided an opportunity to learn
two things: (1) whether the title and description of that expert matters;
and (2) whether the information (the science) actually matters in indi-
vidual decision making and opinion formation.
C. Youth Sports Interventions Experiment—The Messenger
The experiment divided the overall sample into three roughly equal
groups that received the same four-suggestion set but varied the mes-
senger.  The doctor (657 respondents), public health (668 respon-
dents), and Michelle Obama (685 respondents) groups all contained
roughly equal numbers of respondents and nonrespondents (ten, eigh-
teen, and eleven respondents respectively).  Respondents were
presented with four questions about proposed public health law inter-
ventions with respect to youth sports rooted in a series of recently
proposed or enacted interventions based on the Lystedt framework
discussed supra.  Because many of the states were passing public
health law interventions at the time of the survey, the question sought
to decouple those live debates from the question choice set.  There-
fore, respondents were asked about their support for these policies
being adopted at the local school level.  The questions were framed to
explicitly raise awareness about the messenger of these laws and,
when necessary, the explicit individual choice set presented by adop-
tion of these laws.
Respondents were presented with a general summary and lead for
the question as follows:
Recently, efforts have been made by a variety of public health
officials and groups, such as [], to promote youth physical activity
such as through organized sports or daily exercise. But [] also want
to ensure that the activities are safe and do not lead to injuries or
physical harm. The following are some suggestions that have been
made to help make youth physical activity safer.  For each sugges-
tion, please indicate how you would feel about such a requirement
being adopted by your local schools.
Within each bracket space above, the messenger was identified as:
(1) Public health officials and groups, such as the American Public
Health Association;
(2) political figures and government officials, such as First Lady
Michelle Obama; or
(3) doctors’ and physicians’ groups, such as the American Medical
Association.
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Following the general lead above, respondents were then given the
choice of how they would feel about particular suggestions being
adopted by their local schools.
Suggestions were in the form of four choices framed as follows:
(1) Requiring annual physicals for children involved in organized
school sports;
(2) requiring children who participate in contact sports to undergo
special training about the risk of concussions or head injuries;
(3) requiring parents who coach grade school or high school organ-
ized sports to become certified in first-aid and prevention of
injuries; or
(4) eliminating “high-risk” sports, such as football, from local
schools.
Responses were coded on a Likert scale from 1: strongly support the
law, to 7: strongly oppose the law.
1. RESULTS
The results of the four messenger experiments are provided in Table
2.
TABLE 2. MEAN DIFFERENCES BY MESSENGER ACROSS POLICIES
Public
Proposed Intervention Doctors Politicians Health
Annual Physical 1.86 (.051) 1.93 (.052) 1.85 (.054)
Parents First Aid 1.81 (.049) 1.91 (.053) 1.74 (.048)
Children TBI Information 2.06 (.054) 2.17 (.058) 2.15 (.056)
Eliminate Risky Sports 5.10 (.079) 5.09 (.079) 5.20 (.076)
*p < .05 (none) Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.)
The consistency of responses across three of the four abovemen-
tioned questions undermines a central hypothesis of this Article: that
the perceived quality of the messenger or advocate—or at least the
differences between the type of advocate—would causally contribute
toward an upward or downward shift in public opinion about various
interventions.  Indeed, other recent research confirms this finding:
that the quality of the messenger, assuming that she retains some
baseline of credibility, does not substantially affect individual opinion
about certain public health law interventions.151
151. See Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 494, for example, applying a legitimacy framework R
to support new frontier public health interventions and finding little correlation between public
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But, there are apparently some areas that survey respondents feel
that public health law should not touch, a sacred sphere, that is di-
rectly regulating the content of sports by eliminating them.  Viewed
through the lens of legitimacy, the public’s perception of the proposed
law (the ban) must reflect a belief that the regulatory authority is enti-
tled to regulate the issue space, and this belief is a component of the
authority’s legitimacy.152  Thus, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that
the public generally believes public health authorities, doctors, and
politicians all equally lack both the expertise to persuade the public of
their authority to propose this particular intervention and that such an
intervention, regardless of who would propose or implement it, should
not be the subject of government action.  It may also be rooted in a
broad consensus about the value of individual liberty, where laws that
provide the most invasive form of liberty restraint are expected to
produce the lowest levels of public support.153  It may reflect sociolog-
ical norms about sports situated against a history of light touch or
nonregulation of sports rules and norms.154  But, while general aver-
sion to this particular policy may indeed reflect a fundamental rejec-
tion of regulatory legitimacy in this space, a general proliberty bias, or
a sociological aversion to interference with sports norms, the relative
strength of that rejection may be mediated by efforts to educate and
inform the public of the reasoning behind the policy.  Thus, the focus
of the next experiment was to test the value of information and educa-
tion within this policy space.
D. Youth Sports Interventions Experiment—The Message
As Professor Jeffrey Swanson and colleagues explain, in contested
public health policy domains “people act on the basis of their beliefs,
and they tend to support policies that assume those beliefs and per-
ceptions to be true.”155  Therefore, a related objective of this study
was to evaluate the potentially positive impact that empirically rooted
scientific information could have on increasing the public’s support for
support for these interventions and individual perceptions of “the trustworthiness of public
health officials, their record on respecting individual rights, or their performance generally.”
152. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOP-
ERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 101–05 (2002).
153. Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 493 (“One key finding is that the greater the restraint a R
legal intervention imposes on individual liberty, the greater public opposition to the intervention
is likely to be.”).
154. See Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion Management in
Youth Sports, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J., Spring 2013, at 28, 43 (discussing the difficulty in chang-
ing sports cultural norms).
155. See Swanson et al., supra note 10, at 367. R
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a public health law intervention that they previously opposed.156  Fur-
ther, this message was designed as an alternative to the narrative-
driven framework that led to the adoption of many states’ youth
sports TBI laws.157  Immediately after answering the question in sub-
section VI.C, respondents were asked to reconsider their policy sup-
port via the following question.
Following up on your response to the question above about elimi-
nating high-risk sports, would it change your opinion if you knew
that leading health experts have testified that the risk of permanent
damage from low-level concussions in many high school sports
means that there’s a chance that children who play those sports may
end up with long-term potential brain damage years later?  If this
statement was true, how would this affect your thoughts on elimi-
nating ‘high-risk’ school organized youth sports?
Following the question lead above, all respondents were given the
choice of identifying whether or not the information provided would
influence their likelihood of supporting the adoption of the “eliminate
high-risk sports” suggestion at the local school level.  It was expected
that if members of the public, primed on a given policy, were given
further risk centered information about how a specific intervention
would substantially change public health outcomes, they would be
more likely to support the intervention due to this explicit risk
framing.158
The response categories for the question were as follows:
(1) I would be more inclined to support keeping those programs.
(2) I would be more inclined to get rid of those programs.
(3) It doesn’t change my mind at all.
The experiment results indicated that 1,200 respondents (58.45%)
would not change their minds after being provided with this further
information.  Of the remaining, 597 respondents (29.08%) indicated
they would be more inclined to support the policy change, and only
256 respondents (12.47%) indicated that they would be less likely to
support the policy change.  What then should the observer of opinion
156. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Law: A Field of Gaps, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. (SPE-
CIAL ISSUE) 1, 3–4 (2009–2010) (describing how public support for particular medical decisions
or policies changes depending on how they are explained by doctors and lawmakers).
157. See generally David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797,
837–39 (1998) (describing the perils of the anecdote in the process of lawmaking).
158. See generally Kathleen E. Bachynski & Daniel S. Goldberg, Youth Sports & Public
Health: Framing Risks of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in American Football and Ice Hockey, 42
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 323 (2014) (analyzing risk frameworks and public health consequences of
various risk frames).
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make of the fact that when given information that should sway indi-
vidual opinion toward the policy, less than one-third of all respon-
dents moved in the predicted direction?
E. Conclusions About Youth Sports Interventions
The results, when disaggregated by sociodemographic groups, tell a
more nuanced story.  Respondents who identified as liberal women
were more likely to respond—with a statistically significant differ-
ence—that the information made a difference in the predicted direc-
tion.  In contrast, those who identified as white, male, and
conservative were the least likely to be swayed by the additional infor-
mation.  Putting these numbers in context, more than 70% of con-
servative respondents indicated that the information would make no
difference.  What should one make of this conservative resistance to
more information, particularly when many theorists reject a simple
sociodemographic aversion to science in political reasoning?  To ex-
plore these potential confounding influences across the entire survey,
this Article turns to analysis of the results separated by individual
demographics, using a political psychology framework.
VII. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIANCE AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR LAW INTERVENTION
A. Race and Interventions
Reflecting across the entire set of nine public health law interven-
tion questions presented in this Article, racial differences emerge
across half of them, particularly when racial differences are aggre-
gated to a white group or an ethnic minority group identification.
While no significant racial differences are found in the responses to
law interventions involving calorie counts, annual physicals, and train-
ing of parents in first aid, white respondents were significantly more
likely to oppose the remaining public health law interventions (smok-
ing proposals, soda bans, youth sports risk-based education, and ban-
ning of sports) by comfortable margins, as shown in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS
(MEAN RESPONSES BY RACE)
People of
White Color Mean
Proposed Intervention Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Difference
Fast-Food Calories 2.33 (.049) 2.19 (.064)
Sit-Down Calories 2.46 (.049) 2.32 (.061)
Soda Ban 2.84 (.055) 2.55 (.074) P<.01
City Smoking Ban 2.64 (.058) 2.09 (.073) P<.01
Car Smoking Ban 2.33 (.052) 1.83 (.062) P<.01
Annual Physical 1.89 (.038) 1.87 (.050)
Train Parents 1.81 (.036) 1.82 (.048)
Educate Students 2.19 (.040) 1.99 (.052) P<.01
Eliminate Risky Sports 5.42 (.051) 4.45 (.084) P<.01
This finding somewhat conflicts with others, such as that of Laurie
Beck and colleagues, who found that racial differences in law compli-
ance for a given public health law intervention were less than ex-
pected—even nonsignificant—between certain groups.159  It is
possible that gaps in general support for a law do not actually influ-
ence individual-behavioral modification, or it is also possible that the
data presented for this Article is consistent with a widespread general
gap across ethnic groups for both support and adoption of interven-
tions.  For example, Morain and Mello found that African-Americans
and Latinos were more supportive of various new-frontier public
health law interventions, and that these differences had a large and
significant effect size.160  Further research is needed to clarify these
uncertainties.  Because public health law interventions target a wide
and diverse audience to reach the same broad public health goal, it is
worth considering whether this one-size-fits-all messaging makes
sense.  It is troubling that groups most sympathetic to the intervention
are also those least likely to be positively impacted by it.161  Put differ-
ently, while members of minority groups support a variety of nudges,
evidence suggests that within these public health domains, these
groups are overrepresented in negative public health outcomes (e.g.
159. See Laurie Beck et al., Associations Between Sociodemographics and Safety Belt Use in
States with and Without Primary Enforcement Laws, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1619, 1622 (2007).
160. Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 493. R
161. Compare the results presented above, showing strong minority-group support for inter-
ventions, with the outcomes presented in James L. Pirkle et al., Trends in the Exposure of Non-
smokers in the U.S. Population to Secondhand Smoke: 1988–2002, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
853, 854–55 (2006), which showed that people of color are disproportionately impacted by
secondhand smoke despite prior public health interventions.
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smoking harms, food and diet harms, and sports injuries).  This dis-
connect between support, expected behavioral changes, and public
health outcomes for minority group members could be due to many
reasons, but it may be that one core cause of this disparity is the fail-
ure to properly calibrate the messenger and the message to particular
demographic constituencies.  This failure may be because society has
little to no prior knowledge about why particular sociodemographic
groups respond positively or negatively to certain interventions.162
B. Gender, Ideology, and Behavior-Identified Groups
Some sociodemographic groups present divergent responses across
almost all public health law intervention domains described in this Ar-
ticle.  This is particularly true of differences between male and female
respondents and the responses of conservatives versus moderate and
liberal respondents, as shown in Tables 4 and 5.
TABLE 4. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS
(MEAN RESPONSES BY GENDER)
Male Female Mean
Proposed Intervention Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Difference
Fast-Food Calories 2.46 (.049) 1.91 (.059) P<.01
Sit-Down Calories 2.60 (.049) 2.00 (.059) P<.01
Soda Ban 2.93 (.055) 2.35 (.072) P<.01
City Smoking Ban 2.60 (.058) 2.19 (.076) P<.01
Car Smoking Ban 2.31 (.052) 1.86 (.065) P<.01
Annual Physical 1.98 (.038) 1.67 (.048) P<.01
Train Parents 1.93 (.036) 1.57 (.047) P<.01
Educate Students 2.24 (.040) 1.89 (.052) P<.01
Eliminate Risky Sports 5.16 (.055) 5.03 (.079)
162. See Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 494 (calling for those who are selling the efficacy of R
these interventions to “seek to understand the values held by different segments of the popula-
tion and incorporate those values into policy decisions”).
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TABLE 5. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS
(MEAN RESPONSES BY IDEOLOGY)
Conservative Moderate/Liberal Mean
Proposed Intervention Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Difference
Fast-Food Calories 2.91 (.085) 2.02 (.040) P<.01
Sit-Down Calories 3.02 (.084) 2.15 (.040) P<.01
Soda Ban 3.34 (.089) 2.49 (.049) P<.01
City Smoking Ban 2.82 (.093) 2.32 (.052) P<.01
Car Smoking 2.64 (.088) 1.97 (.044) P<.01
Annual Physical 2.01 (.063) 1.83 (.034) P<.01
Train Parents 2.08 (.063) 1.70 (.030) P<.01
Educate Students 2.51 (.068) 1.97 (.034) P<.01
Eliminate Risky Sports 5.78 (.072) 4.83 (.055) P<.01
The directional differences between both groups are as expected.163
On eight of the nine interventions (except football elimination) male
respondents exhibited statistically significant lower support.  For con-
servatives, the results are evidence of statistically significant lower
support for all nine proposed public health law interventions.
Viewed through the lens of a political–psychological framework, the
consistency of the conservative responses and the resistance to educa-
tion are consistent with an affective decision-making heuristic—an in-
stinctively political response to the public health intervention
regardless of its potential or actual efficacy.164  For this soci-
odemographic group, there may be less balancing of the objective sci-
entific evidence and more of an instinctive switch-flipping orientation
toward policy, which would provide an initial range for how one feels
about any intervention, separate from an evaluation of the actual costs
and benefits of the intervention itself.165  One indicator of this affec-
tive disposition may be the resistance to a particular public health law
intervention regardless of invasiveness, deterrence, or individual costs.
If conservatives resist these interventions, notwithstanding all of these
mediators, it may suggest a more direct affective evaluation of the in-
terventions themselves.  Therefore, particularly with respect to mem-
bers of the sample who identify as conservative, opinions and
163. The differences described in this Article were evaluated in isolation using analysis of
variance tools to measure group response differences across sociodemographic characteristics.
164. See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and
Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000) (finding that instinctive affect-based re-
sponses to a stimulus influence individual judgment about the risks and benefits of specific
hazards).
165. Id. See generally George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267
(2001) (suggesting that a decision maker’s immediate visceral reactions to risks and uncertainties
in decison making may prevent them from engaging in a cost-benefit weighing of their choices).
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behaviors could be viewed as an emotional predisposition against all
of these interventions based on a perceived or actual distance between
these actions and one’s individual political orientation.166  If so, this
would serve as confirmation that, generally speaking, one’s political
psychology, if conservative, causes a drop in support for any public
health intervention and a drop in expected compliance with the inter-
vention’s policy and law changes (such as ignoring calorie counts or
other law-required information).  This approach is consistent with the
observations of others that conservatives, whose ideology is rooted in
a mistrust of government’s moral or legal authority beyond a limited
sphere, may experience a psychological predisposition to oppose these
policies, through both noncompliance with formal legal rules (for ex-
ample, smoking in places forbidden by law) and by choosing to ignore
behavior modifications rooted in information-based regimes (for ex-
ample, ignoring calorie counts when evaluating food choices).167
TABLE 6. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS
(MEAN RESPONSES BY SMOKER-STATUS)
Smoker Nonsmoker Mean
Proposed Intervention Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.) Difference
Fast-Food Calories 2.48 (.103) 2.25 (.042) P<.05
Sit-Down Calories 2.59 (.099) 2.38 (.042) P<.05
Soda Ban 3.00 (.113) 2.70 (.048) P<.01
City Smoking Ban 4.16 (.127) 2.12 (.045) P<.01
Car Smoking Ban 2.83 (.119) 2.04 (.043) P<.01
Annual Physical 1.93 (.076) 1.88 (.033)
Train Parents 1.83 (.072) 1.81 (.031)
Educate Students 2.17 (.079) 2.12 (.035)
Eliminate Risky Sports 5.16 (.109) 5.11 (.049)
166. The only other public opinion survey of a similar scope, Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at R
493, initially hypothesized that respondents’ views on legitimacy might provide an alternative
explanation—whether causal or correlational—with decisional variance across subgroups.  Yet,
concepts of trust in public health officials, perceptions of procedural fairness in public health
decision making, and public perception of the quality of public health messenger’s performance
were not significantly associated with public support of a given public health law intervention.
167. See Margaret Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354 (2009) (describing the nexus between acceptance of legitimacy and
adoption of beliefs); see also Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense
of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGICAL MED. (SPECIAL ISSUE) s138 (Supp. 2003).
See William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of Richard Epstein’s Defense
of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGICAL MED. (SPECIAL ISSUE) s176 (Supp. 2003), for
a response to the claims.
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In contrast, for example, Table 6 shows results for respondents who
identify as smokers and have a more sophisticated form of policy-sup-
port differentiation.  This works well within an identity-protective cog-
nitive framework of the kind described by Kahan and colleagues as
well as a political–psychological framework.  As Kahan and Braman
explain: “It’s not comforting—indeed, it’s psychically disabling—to
entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that force
one to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one’s iden-
tity.”168  Smokers reported differential (lower) levels of support for
five of the nine proposed policies, all of which involved government
regulation of smokers’ conduct or governmental efforts to control
content (soda) and the provision of calorie count information to the
general public (education).  Put differently, with respect to youth
sports regimes, smokers’ responses were indistinguishable from the
general public.  But, with regimes that either eliminated freedom of
choice or required that choice be informed by additional information,
smokers were less likely to support the proposed intervention.  This
suggests that smokers’ policy-values may operate across more than
one vector and may indeed include broad principled reasoning rooted
in belief systems involving information, autonomy, choice, and risk.
Further research is needed to test the strength of these connections.
The reason may also be that laws blurring the line between a behavior
(smoking) and status (smoker) may in fact cause health harms to
those whose status or identity is disempowered by the law.169  But in
truth, the “why” behind either consistent conservative rejection of
these interventions or the more sophisticated form of smoker rejec-
tion may not matter as much as some scholars think.
This is because public health law advocates and scholars may have
assumed that a given legal intervention, if properly communicated and
supported by data about the potential effectiveness of its results,
would result in widespread adoption by the general public.170  These
advocates have reasonably postulated that “documenting the effec-
tiveness” of these laws would not only help achieve compliance but
168. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 149, 155 (2006).
169. For example, law and society scholars suggest that laws expanding opportunity or are
inclusive of historically disempowered groups will lead to greater health outcomes as a result of
decreasing the stress associated with membership in a group that laws discriminate against. See,
e.g., Jason Schnittker & Jane D. McLeod, The Social Psychology of Health Disparities, 31 ANN.
REV. SOCIOL. 75, 84–86 (2005); David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION:
LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003).
170. See, e.g., Morain & Mello, supra note 9, at 486–87. R
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also encourage expansion of existing iterations of these laws.171  But,
with respect to the individuals identifying themselves as conservative,
the consistency across all policy choices, and the education question,
suggests something more basic at work.
C. Critiquing the Political–Psychological Approach
The survey results present substantial barriers, empirically and oth-
erwise, for those scholars and advocates across public health domains
who believe that the transmission of law through general communica-
tion and the education and information content of these laws will ac-
tually result in changed individual behavior—different public health
choices.  Instead, while a variety of familiar sociodemographic vari-
ables are correlated with increased support or opposition to public
health law interventions, the challenge of reaching or selling conserva-
tives is greater than previously assumed.172  Thus, a politi-
cal–psychological approach to the theory behind public health
lawmaking and public health law communication is necessary, and it
may be useful to first focus on the group with the most resistance
(conservatives) because it has the most room for overall population
impact on a raw number basis given the express resistance and the fact
that this group is a significant portion of the overall U.S.
population.173
But, other sociodemographic groups may also benefit from a
targeted messaging approach.  More research is needed to identify
how and when these approaches would be most effective; however, as
an initial matter, many public health marketing campaigns are already
aligned and targeted to singular sociodemographic constituencies (i.e.
those captured by Nielsen ratings), and thus, the sociodemographic
data in its simplest form allows for a simple deployment of targeted
campaigns along simple slices of these demographics.  At present,
these communications are still needed.  Similarly, with respect to ef-
forts to communicate more effectively, Kahan’s 2014 vaccination
171. See Dinh-Zahr et al., supra note 7, at 50 (discussing the effectiveness of seatbelts). R
172. For example, conservative ideology could be determinative of individual responses to
nudge interventions in a way similar to the conflict between state actors and the federal govern-
ment with respect to state resistance to ACA implementation.  Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhe-
torical Federalism: The Role of State Resistance in Health Care Decision Making, 39 J.L. MED.
ETHICS 73, 75 (2011) (identifying how a focus on “rhetorical federalism” could cause a juxtaposi-
tion between “political issues of individual rights and the role of government in health care”).
173. But see Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural
Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3 (1987) (suggesting that ideology plays
less of a role than described in this Article).
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study builds on these insights and leads toward a bold conclusion.174
For Kahan, more research about the scientific efficacy of certain pub-
lic health initiatives is not the answer.  Scholars should stop focusing
energy on proving that a problem exists and that their solution—legal
or otherwise—is the primary way to stop it.  Instead, “[t]he most im-
portant [conclusion of recent research] is that the public health estab-
lishment play a more active leadership role in risk communication.”175
VIII. CONCLUSION
To move the science of public health lawmaking forward, future re-
search should place more emphasis on both the theoretical and empir-
ical foundations of health policy, public opinion, and the
internalization of legal norms.  There is still much unknown about
how and why individuals choose to reject or accept modern nudge-
based public health law interventions and about the need for either a
complex or simplified framework for this approach.  Ideally, this new
research would lead toward greater clarity about both support and
internalization, which would then lead toward a new and more com-
prehensive framework focused on the communication of law to di-
verse sociodemographic groups in ways that best maximize the
likelihood that these groups will support these interventions and
adopt the desired behavior modification.
Further, data is needed that focuses on intersectional race, gender,
sexual orientation, regional, and income differences in public opinion
about public health law interventions, particularly given that core
public health and medicine interventions have had cross-sectional im-
pacts.176  For example, it may be possible that low-income African-
American women have significantly lower levels of support for these
interventions, given this group’s unique experiences with public health
interventions over time.177  Similarly, the data presented in this Arti-
cle, like many other large public opinion samples, was not analyzed
for the unique opinions and experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, queer, intersexual, and asexual (LGBTQIA) respondents
with respect to government authority and legal regimes178 because the
174. KAHAN, supra note 11, at 4. R
175. Id.
176. See Nan D. Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity: The Role of Autonomy, Equal-
ity, and Participation Norms, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1525, 1528–35 (2010) (discussing the
impact of civil rights movements on informed consent).
177. See Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1657–66
(2008).
178. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Civil Rights 3.0, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES?
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz eds.) (forthcoming).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 45 25-JAN-16 8:38
2015] NUDGING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 101
survey panel from which respondents were drawn did not ask respon-
dents for LGBTQIA self-identification.  With respect to income and
intersectionality, robust normative scholarship regarding the impor-
tance of income in determining the quality and provision of health-
care179 can be bridged with further research about how and why some
low-income, diverse populations may support public-health interven-
tions at higher rates notwithstanding receiving what many perceive to
be substandard care.  With respect to the intersection of geography
and the above factors, perhaps public opinion of these reforms reflects
not only a traditional red-state, blue-state bias, but an urban-rural dis-
tinction within these states.180  Thus, further refinement of both sur-
vey panel recruitment methodologies and sociodemographic
representation within these panels may yield further insights into the
role that these differences play in the acceptance or rejection of public
health law interventions.181  Finally, further research about the link
between public opinion and adoption of public health nudges must
extend beyond conventional U.S. samples to incorporate a larger sam-
pling of opinions from individuals around the globe to determine
whether the broad scale acceptance of public health law interventions
in the United States extends to a variety of other populations and po-
litical regimes.182
Ultimately, what does this shift from coercion to nudging mean for
public health outcomes and public health law research?  With respect
to outcomes, if the public initially resists these new interventions or
doubts their efficacy, how can the public’s health be substantially im-
proved over time?  With respect to research, other scholars of public
health law research rightly define this problem as the “characteristic
twenty-first-century public health law challenge: how to change in-
grained, satisfying, normative, and profitable, behavior by manipulat-
ing the environment and nudging individuals.”183  But, new public
179. See Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 269 (2010).
180. See Sidney D. Watson, Mending the Fabric of Small Town America: Health Reform &
Rural Economies, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2010).
181. It is fair to say that some of the political variance described here may be a national or
regional artifact of the partisan alignments for these particular public health law interventions.
A helpful reviewer identified that other public-health interventions may have a different parti-
san valence and may thus challenge assumptions present in this initial inquiry.  Further research
is needed to test these hypotheses.
182. See generally Patricia C. Kuszler, Global Health and the Human Rights Imperative, 2
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 99 (2007); Michelle Marie Mello et al., The Role of
Law in Public Health: The Case of Family Planning in the Philippines, 63 SOC. SCI. & MED. 384
(2006).
183. Scott Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half-
Century of Public Health Law Research, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 95, 105 (2013).
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health law interventions, even those designed as nudges, may still en-
counter substantial public resistance—particularly from identifiable
subsets of the body-politic. Therefore, for these interventions to have
their intended impact, lawmakers and scholars must anticipate and de-
vise ways to efficiently surmount that resistance by first understanding
the differences in how populations perceive and respond to these laws.
The death of public health law intervention popularity (and the
boogeyman of paternalism) may be somewhat exaggerated.  Public
support for public health law interventions is generally quite high, sug-
gesting that further interventions, on a variety of matters, may receive
a strong baseline of support.  Yet, there remains a substantial gap be-
tween the policies that respondents want and the interventions they
receive.  Further, because of strong sociodemographic and political
differences in responses to interventions, the efficacy of nudge-based
interventions may ultimately depend on how much members of partic-
ular groups like the intervention and are encouraged to adopt and
maintain it.  Thus, going forward, more research is needed to increase
the efficacy and efficiency of future nudge-based public health law
interventions.
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APPENDIX
The survey was administered online using SurveyMonkey’s online
panel tool, a standing, probability-based, nationally representative
sample of U.S. adults maintained by SurveyMonkey.  SurveyMonkey’s
online panel members are recruited on a rolling basis and asked to
participate in a variety of online surveys for SurveyMonkey’s paid
subscribers.  Panel members are initially recruited through their utili-
zation of SurveyMonkey’s free-sampling tool, which is widely availa-
ble and used by a cross sample of U.S. individuals and households.
SurveyMonkey collects data on individual panel members’ demo-
graphic characteristics, ranging from gender, race, and address, to po-
litical view, income, and education.  For this survey, I requested a
sampling frame of nationally representative members of ethnic minor-
ity groups.  The final survey was fielded during July 2013, and
SurveyMonkey provided a merged data file that included the re-
sponses and participant demographic information.  I selected 2,500 re-
spondents to receive the survey, and 2,043 completed the survey (a
81% participation rate).184  The survey was fielded over a period of
several days and included a daily reminder.185  Of the survey respon-
dents, 51.7% identified as married, 17.2% as smokers, 68% as male,
and 69.3% as white.  Further 37% of the sample identified as liberal,
30% identified as conservative, and the remainder identified as
moderates.  While these percentages are not fully representative of
the national population, the statistical analyses performed herein still
provide robust results when differentiating attitudes between various
groups.
The data analysis described herein uses the raw unweighted results
for some descriptions of trends.  Further, when presenting data from
questions with Likert scales,186 respondents were grouped into nar-
rower categories than the full seven-point scale response provided (for
example, support or nonsupport versus ranges of support).  Finally,
this Article focuses primarily on the demographic differences between
groups to describe broad trends and explain the sociodemographic
distinctions between group support.  These variables included race,
184. See AAPOR TASK FORCE, AAPOR REPORT ON ONLINE PANELS 26 (2010) and INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, STANDARD 26362 (2009) for further discus-
sion of the participation rate criteria.
185. No evidence of bias was found for those who did not participate in or complete the
survey.
186. See generally I. Elaine Allen & Christopher A. Seaman, Likert Scales and Data Analyses,
QUALITY PROGRESS, July 2007, at 64, 64  (2007) (providing an explanation of Likert scales).
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smoker status, political ideology, sex, and gender.187  Missing soci-
odemographic data were rare (1% or less), which is a result of the
panel-participation criteria that required the maintenance and collec-
tion of this information prior to participation.188
187. These are all self-identified, and future work may incorporate additional measures de-
signed to identify more factors (LGBTQIA status) as well as metrics designed to further explore
underlying ideological differences within self-identified ideological groups.
188. Naturally, there are many critiques of panel data, and those critiques shall not be re-
peated at length here.  Certainly, the interpretation of these surveys should be contextualized
against nonobservational and observational limitations, processing and dissemination con-
straints, selection bias, questionnaire wording, and reporting accuracy, among other things.  But,
specifically speaking, one qualification bears particular mention here—SurveyMonkey’s online
panel is a volunteer, opt-in panel incentivized for participation through a variety of available
(and unavailable) metrics, and therefore, some survey metrics, such as response rates, have no
comparable analogue in this space.
